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 i 
ABSTRACT  
   
Government performance and accountability have grown to be 
predominant areas within public administration literature over the last forty years. 
The research presented in this dissertation examines the relationship between 
citizen satisfaction and local government performance. Citizen review of service 
delivery provides vital feedback that facilitates better resource management 
within local government.  
Using data from a single jurisdiction, two aspects of citizen satisfaction 
are reviewed. This includes citizen review of overall city performance, and citizen 
satisfaction with individual service delivery. Logit regression analysis is used to 
test several factors that affect citizen evaluation of service delivery in local 
government, while ordinary least squares regression is used to test the relationship 
between personal factors and citizen evaluation of specific local services.  
The results generated four major findings that contribute to the scholarly 
body of knowledge and local government knowledge application. First, citizens 
who are predisposed to supporting the local jurisdiction are more likely to rate 
service delivery high. Second, customer service is important. Third, those who 
experience government services similarly will collectively react similarly to the 
service experience. Finally, the length of residency has an impact on satisfaction 
levels with specific services. Implications for the literature as well as for practice 
are discussed. 
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation examines citizen satisfaction with local government 
services and performance.  Two dimensions of citizen satisfaction are reviewed; 
one, citizen review of the overall city performance, and two, specific citizen 
satisfaction with individual service delivery.   To examine this relationship, the 
City of Phoenix, Arizona is used as a case study.  Because citizen evaluation of 
city performance remains a high priority on their agenda, Phoenix commissions a 
biannual survey to glean citizen review of government services and performance.  
These data are used to examine the relationship between citizen review and local 
government performance and service delivery.  Chapter 1 provides a further 
description detailing why this relationship is important to understand and outlines 
the specific research questions.     
Every day, citizens interact with local government willingly or not.  
Whether it is getting trash picked up on the correct day, getting the street plowed 
after a hard snow fall, going to the library to use the Internet, or paying taxes, 
local government is part of one’s daily life.  Given this interaction, it becomes 
necessary for government officials and bureaucrats alike to pay close attention to 
their citizen’s response to local government service and performance.  Citizen 
reviews can take on many forms including citizen opinion surveys, needs 
assessments, and program and policy evaluations.  Ultimately, these reviews 
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factor into the quality of life aspect and can determine the health and longevity of 
a city.   
Fundamentally, a citizen review provides necessary feedback that enables 
local government administration the opportunity to manage its resources – money, 
staff, time, or some combination thereof.  For example, if a review of library 
performance data is excellent, and the citizen satisfaction with library services is 
also excellent, then local administrators can determine to keep current levels of 
resources (funding, staff, hours of operation) intact, or shift resources (give more 
or take away from) where needed.   
The idea of government performance and accountability became relevant 
and increasingly more predominant to the public administration literature within 
the last thirty to forty years.  Initially, this type of review centered on outcome 
performance measures (Brown & Coulter, 1983)  Local governments could 
determine whether or not the service they were providing measured up to 
normative criteria, and/or national benchmarking standards.  For example, in 
reviewing police services, a performance measure could include the response time 
to a call, the number of arrests, lower crime statistics, etc.   
The late 1980’s and 1990’s saw a shift from performance outcome 
measures, to citizen satisfaction surveys.  Arguably, this shift resulted from an 
increased focus on government accountability and the ‘reinvention of 
government’ (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992).  Under this paradigm, a review of 
police services included performance outcome measures as well as the citizen 
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review of those services.  For example, if you are Chief of Police and have 
excellent performance outcome measurements, yet the citizens still rank police 
services as poor, you have problems on your hand.  Dissecting this information 
based on population, age, race/ethnicity, gender, income, neighborhood, etc. can 
exacerbate the problem.   
Ultimately, cities compete to attract business, industry and people.  The 
quality and caliber of such is determined by the performance and sustainability of 
that city to continue its growth and attractiveness.  In present day terms, it is the 
difference of being Seattle, Washington, versus Detroit, Michigan.   
Fundamentally, citizen input into government has always been part of the 
check and balance process.  Ultimately, this review is actualized through the 
voting process of government officials.  While a city manager represents the 
bureaucratic side of government, citizen accountability of government’s 
performance remains at the elected official level; i.e., mayor, city councilman, 
judges, etc.  Elected government officials then hold government bureaucrats 
accountable from the city manager down to the clerk level.    
Part of the ‘reinventing government’ model included the outsourcing of 
many municipal services out to private contractors, based on the belief that 
private enterprises were more cost efficient.  It also represents an alternative 
means of local officials for holding government bureaucrats accountable.  The 
threat of outsourcing can ‘rejuvenate’ or motivate a lackluster department to 
reprioritize its efforts to carrying forth its mission.   
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The active role of a civil society adds legitimacy and is a crucial element 
towards the success and viability of democratic governments.  Citizen 
participation is paramount to this process, and the opportunity for citizens to 
participate and vocalize their priorities within the community can become a 
determinant of how successfully that community develops.  An examination of 
this relationship is robust in the literature – see Putnam, 1993 for further review.   
 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
While it is important to review citizen evaluation of local government 
performance and service, a critical review of the following research questions 
yields specific attention to the uniqueness of demographic and community 
variables.   
 
Question 1:  What factors determine citizens’ evaluations of local government 
performance and service delivery?  In particular, to what extend do such 
evaluations hinge on personal experience with local government?  
   
There are several veins within the literature that flesh out the role of 
personal experience.  Seminal work by Michael Lipsky (1980) examines the 
importance of street level bureaucrats with respect to service delivery and 
performance.  For example, a citizen’s review of police service can squarely rest 
on one’s personal experience.  If one is stopped by a police officer and receives a 
ticket for a traffic violation, is the review positive because the officer was 
enforcing the law, or negative, because the individual experienced a negative 
consequence for one’s personal failure to adhere to traffic laws?   
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 How long does the positive or negative experience with a street level 
bureaucrat resonate and what is the long term effect?  This specific question is 
difficult to answer but nonetheless plays a role in the determination and review of 
government performance.   
 
Question 2: Does citizen evaluation of local government and service delivery 
generally differ from citizen evaluation of local government performance with 
respect to specific services?  
 
 The existing literature does not focus and call attention to this theoretical 
consideration.  The idea here of course is that generally, specific services can 
have low satisfaction rates and yet not impact the overall satisfaction levels of city 
services.  So what if the city’s satisfaction level of “controlling street flooding” 
yields low levels of satisfaction – especially given that the annual rainfall in 
Phoenix is considerably low.  In addition, specific sub-populations can rate 
specific services low, and yield the same effect; an overall high satisfaction with 
local government provision and delivery of services.   
Taken together, this would seemingly yield what I would call the “good 
enough” effect of citizen satisfaction with the provision and delivery of services 
with local government.  As long as the level of dissatisfaction with a specific 
service does not have a negative effect on the overall level of satisfaction, there is 
no motivation for local government to address the dissatisfaction because it 
ultimately doesn’t have a net impact.  This would hold true with sub-populations 
as well.  This concept is similar to explaining full employment, whereby a 
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percentage of unemployment is accepted within the definition.  It stands to reason 
then, if overall satisfaction with local government services is evident, there could 
also be a level of dissatisfaction with specific service delivery, but not to the 
extent that it displaces overall satisfaction.   
Question 3:  How does race/ethnicity factor into citizens evaluation of 
government performance and service?  And, if so, how does it interact with 
factors such as actual service experience?   
 
While race is a social construct, its effects continue to be experienced.  
Formally, over the last fifty years, much has been done in the form of public 
policy changes, yet, on an individual level, racism remains.  Race Matters (West, 
1993) brought the conversation of race to a popular mainstream audience.  Within 
the introduction West discusses his personal difficulties experienced with local 
police within the Princeton University area.  As a black man, he describes that he 
“didn’t belong” within that community and hence received special attention from 
police, despite being a university professor.  West’s experiences area not unique 
by any measure.   
Contextually, you don’t have to be black to know that race indeed matters.  
Within the urban literature, these experiences carry over in understanding if and 
how race/ethnicity plays a role in service delivery.  While the literature 
demonstrates the relationship between race/ethnicity factoring heavily into 
neighborhood composition, this only explores the connection to residential 
segregation.  Nevertheless, race and ethnicity remain as unique variables given 
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the individual human experience.  This question remains important in determining 
whether or not race/ethnicity leads to a different service delivery experience.   
 
Question 4:  How does gender factor into citizens evaluation of government 
performance and service?  And, if so, how does it interact with factors such as 
actual service experience? 
 
Gender differences provide a unique assessment into service delivery.  
Traditionally, women have taken on the responsibility of child rearing and family 
management.  This experience provides the foundation for having unique needs 
from government.  Many veins within the gender literature focus on the 
differences in how men and women are socialized (Norris, 2003; Norrander and 
Wilcox, 2008)  This socialization process coupled with individual experiences 
tends to align women with prioritizing different government services such as 
work force development, child care, services for the elderly, etc.    
 
Question 5:  How does age factor into citizens evaluation of government 
performance and service?  And if so, to what extent does generational change 
impact citizen evaluation of performance and service? 
 
Age and generational differences factor into government performance and 
service evaluation given variances within age-related needs.  For example, 
younger residents (parents and children) may focus their interest on the city’s 
ability to provide art and cultural programs, youth programs, after school 
programs, etc.  Older residents may focus more specifically on their needs for 
assisted living, lower or fixed income housing, community center programs, etc.  
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These normative differences can play a role in determining funding provisions.  
For example, older residents may not see the value in the provision of youth 
programs and may petition to have the city impose fees to support these services 
rather than the allocation of tax revenue.  Given voting blocs among the elderly, 
there may be political ramifications for service redistributions.     
 
Question 6:  How does context and shared experience within neighborhoods 
factor into citizen evaluation of government performance and service?  
  
The distribution of government services across its various neighborhoods 
has been the subject of vast research for over thirty years (Lineberry, 1977, Rich, 
1982, Hero 1986).  Truly, this is the idea of “who gets what, when, and why.”  In 
essence, this is an equity issue, that is, not all neighborhoods are created equal.  
Miller and Miller (1991) found that communities in which residents felt that they 
received the best services tended to be midsized with residents who were 
wealthier and were more likely to commute to a metropolitan job center.    
Contextually, all citizens can attest to this notion.  Does their trash get 
picked up first thing in the morning – are their neighborhood streets the first to be 
plowed – does their neighborhood library have the same hours of operation as the 
other neighborhood libraries?  Are new services introduced in specific 
neighborhoods first, and why?  To some extent, neighborhood preferences can 
contribute to service distribution.  Also, neighborhood preferences can be derived 
from the composition of the neighborhood – that is, a more mature neighborhood 
may have stronger preferences for street repair and mantainence than a newly 
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developed neighborhood.  Additionally, the residential segregation literature is 
compelling and offers a different view towards neighborhood composition.  This 
lens continues to question whether or not neighborhood residency is a matter of 
choice, or necessity.   
 
ORGANIZATION 
Chapter two addresses a detailed review of the literature associated with 
the research questions.  This review provides a theoretical foundation for 
understanding current paradigms related to citizens and local government.  
Chapter three addresses the methodology used.  Discussion of the research design, 
research questions, data collection are included.  Chapter four discusses the 
findings of the research.  Four major findings are reviewed.  Chapter five presents 
a discussion of the implications to both the literature and to practitioners with 
respect to the findings.   
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Chapter 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature review provides an overview of the key areas that support 
broad knowledge with respect to local government and citizens.  The literature 
assesses capacity of local governments to deliver services and includes aspects of 
government structure, privatization of services, and tax base.  To gain a better 
appraisal of residential choice and location, a review of the public choice 
literature is examined.  Taken together, the literature areas present a foundation to 
better understand the relationship between variables found within the research 
model.   
 
PERSONAL EXPERIENCE 
 
The ‘personal contact model’ examines the relationship between personal 
interaction and satisfaction with the government service.  In other words, if 
citizens have a specific contact and personal experience using a service, generally, 
they are satisfied with their review of local government.  Often, personal 
interaction is driven by need and is citizen initiated.  That is, a person needs to 
register a vehicle and needs to interact with someone from the Motor Vehicle 
Department; or a person needs to have utility services turned on and therefore 
contacts someone from the city, or there is a need to have graffiti removed so a 
phone call is placed to the city’s graffiti hotline.  Satisfaction can be derived from 
not only the service provided, but the quality of the interaction.  This aspect is 
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normative in nature, and requires the citizen to review such qualities as 
friendliness, willingness to help, fair treatment, response time, etc.   
As Hero and Durand note (1985), this model underscores the importance 
of Lipsky’s (1980) “street-level bureaucrats” calling attention to the importance of 
personal interaction between citizens and those involved in the immediate 
delivery of public services.  Brown and Coulter (1983) highlight the importance 
between the quality of the interaction between the street level bureaucrat and the 
citizen to reveal the satisfaction level.  Lipsky’s (1980) investigation also revealed 
that satisfaction with contact increases with age.  Not surprising, Brown and 
Coulter (1983) found that satisfaction with police was related to satisfaction with 
response time and treatment by the police, correlating with age and income.  Of 
the three models of citizen satisfaction with urban services assessed by Hero and 
Durand (1985), evidence supported the personal contact model and demonstrated 
the importance of interpersonal contact in influencing how citizens evaluate 
public services.   
Satisfaction with specific municipal services can vary.  Kelly and Swindell 
(2002) compared citizen reviews of their direct experiences with police, fire, 
emergency medical, and parks services to citizen reviews that did not have a 
direct use of the service.  According to their findings, personal experience 
decreases satisfaction with police services and increases satisfaction with 
emergency medical and parks, and that personal experience does not appear to 
affect satisfaction with fire services (p. 101).   
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While personal interaction is a contributing factor within one’s evaluation 
of government services, personal expectations and perceptions also contribute.  
Expectancy disconfirmation has been a dominant model of customer satisfaction 
within private sector consumer behavior studies, and accounts for both positive 
(performance exceeds expectations) and negative (performance does not meet 
expectations) experiences.  The model views satisfaction judgments as determined 
– not just by product or service performance – but by a process in which 
consumers compare performance with their prior expectations (Van Ryzin, 2004).  
The discrepancy or gap between prior expectations and actual performance has 
been termed expectancy disconfirmation (Erevelles and Leavitt, 1992; Oliver, 
1997; Yi, 1990 as cited in Van Ryzin, 2004).   
Van Ryzin (2004) was the first to formally apply the expectancy 
disconfirmation model to public sector citizen survey data.   The results from his 
study suggest citizen responses to urban services are more complex and are not 
just direct performance reviews.  Perceptions of equity in the delivery of urban 
services can factor into overall satisfaction judgments.  In the aggregate, this 
could have profound effects within neighborhoods that compete for services.    
Citizen attitudes and belief systems contribute greatly to key aspects of trust in 
government, generally, and to one’s political identity.  Gamson (1968) 
emphasized political factors to assert that citizen trust in government is important 
because it enables governments to act without having to resort to coercion or the 
use of force for every decision undertaken.  Aberbach and Walker (1970) assert 
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that the level of trust in government strongly influences the kind of policies and 
strategies available to political leaders.  Indeed, legitimacy of political and 
administrative institutions and actors is based largely on trust (Christensen and 
Laegreid, 2005).  Recent political uprisings continue to remind us and reinforce 
how important the concept of trust is to the legitimacy of political regimes and 
their ability to meet citizens’ need for local services.     
A deeper review of the literature surrounding the concept of public trust 
allows us to examine diffuse and specific support for a political system (Easton, 
1965).  Diffuse levels can be seen on an ideological level (people favoring large 
public sectors) and within structural legitimacy (rules and roles of those working 
in government).  Generally, political and cultural factors contribute to diffuse 
support of trust in government.  March and Olsen (1989) found that those who are 
interested or have participated within the political process have more trust in 
government because their engagement lends itself to a better understanding of the 
norms and values within the political-administrative system.  
The concept of specific support encompasses process and output (Easton, 
1965).  The process concept addresses how the decision-making process is carried 
forth; i.e., the approach to problem solving, rules that are followed, the 
competency of government employees, etc. The output concept relates to the 
classic “who gets what” in politics.  Overall, governments can have varying 
combinations of diffuse and specific support that yields different levels of trust.  
The literature does offer empirical examples whereby citizen satisfaction and trust 
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are positively correlated.  Van Ryzin, Muzzio, and Immerwahr (2004) find strong 
links between overall satisfaction with public services at the local level and 
confidence in government.  Yet, Van de Walle, Kampen, and Bouckaert (2005) 
provide evidence that this linkage may be more attributable to a general attitude 
toward government.  Kampen, Van de Walle, and Bouckaert (2006) find that the 
impact of a negative experience with a public agency is much more pronounced 
than the effect of a positive one.    
Public perception of political actors and bureaucrats as it relates to trust 
impacts citizen satisfaction levels and can promote levels of distrust.  Aberbach 
and Rockman (2000) found that citizen needs and perceptions of what services 
should be provided vary, and impact levels of satisfaction.  Clearly, what satisfies 
some may leave others dissatisfied.  However, certain levels of distrust or 
skepticism are institutionalized within democratic systems toward political actors, 
knowing that those actors have motivations based on their own self-interests.  
This is actualized within democracies by providing opportunities for citizens to 
monitor and review the actions of institutions and of political actors (Warren, 
1999).  Christensen and Laegreid (2005) find that citizens are often skeptical 
toward the public sector when asked in general and abstract terms but relatively 
satisfied with more specific services.  Recent evidence suggests that failing 
government performance is at the basis of distrust (Barnes & Gill, 2000; Bok, 
2001).  However, Bouchaert and Van de Walle (2003) assert that the link between 
performance and trust can only be made when specific conditions are present.   
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Distrust and skepticism can manifest into public cynicism and causes 
further forms of alienation and disengagement.  Cynicism can include pervasive 
beliefs that government policies and public officials are corrupt, inept, and out to 
take advantage of citizens (Johnson, 1993).  Berman (1997) found that cynicism 
was present in about one-third of all cities with populations over 50,000.  In 
addition, cities that used frequent information, participation and reputation 
strategies experience less cynicism (Berman, 1997).  
People’s satisfaction with public services as related to trust can be seen in 
a broader or narrower performance perspective (Bouckaert & Van de Walle, 
2003).  Over the last three decades significant literature has been generated which 
has examined the linkages between administrative performance, trust, and citizen 
satisfaction.  Scholarly research generated in the 1980s examined local 
government performance through a “hard” and “soft” lens.  Brown and Coulter 
(1983) and Parks (1984) defined performance data as objective (hard) and citizen 
satisfaction (soft) as subjective.  Most scholars called for linkages between 
objective and subjective data, while practitioners were left on the fence receiving 
citizen evaluations that did not have direct ties to the political ramifications in 
which elected officials establish the priorities (Kelly & Swindell, 2002).   
The Report of the National Commission on Public Service, commonly 
known as the Volcker Commission (1989) released its finding over the public’s 
perceptions of government waste, corruption, and overall ineffectiveness within 
government.  The commission warned that this general distrust undermines the 
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public service and in the long run could jeopardize the democratic process itself 
(Report of the National Commission on the Public Service, 1989, p. 12-13).  
Countless examples of this sentiment have been actively refueling political 
campaigns as opponents market themselves as those who are going to ‘clean up 
the waste.’  A perceived performance gap between the public and private sectors 
pertains to quality and customer service as well as the efficiency of service 
delivery (Poister & Henry, 1994).  Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, the 
integration of ‘total quality management,’ ‘customer driven,’ and ‘continuous 
improvement’ made significant strides in the makeup of the public sector.   
The 1990s ushered in a new line of thinking with respect to the operational 
accountability of government.  Most noticeable, the New Public Management 
paradigm holds government performance and accountability as key variables to its 
literature.  This entrepreneurial model was popularized by Osborne and Gaebler’s 
Reinventing Government (1992) and championed ten basic principles that 
included such reforms as public-private partnerships in delivering public services, 
customer driven-government, results orientated government, and community 
owned government to name a few.  Osborne and Gaebler’s ten basic principles 
provided a new conceptual framework for public administrators and created the 
‘citizen-as-consumer’ model whereby performance measurements were used to 
maximize service effectiveness and thus provide service performance 
improvements captured by increased consumer satisfaction.  Adoption of this new 
model was evident throughout various levels of government, but gained 
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significant attention at the national level through Vice President Al Gore’s 
National Performance Review (1993) which promised more streamlined 
government programs and services.   
 
RACE / ETHNICITY  
 
Cleavages within citizen satisfaction are evident using a race/ethnicity 
lens.  Within society, race has been a powerful social construct.  Race is a 
historically contingent, relational, intersubjective phenomenon – yet it is typically 
misbegotten as a natural, fixed marker of phenotypic difference inherent in human 
bodies, independent of human will or intention (Rumbaut, 2006).  So, does race 
matter?  Conventional wisdom still says yes, and over the years, academic 
scholarship has redefined the importance of race.  This scholarship contains three 
distinct nodes: (1) historical analyses of the interaction between race and U.S. 
political institutions; (2) analyses of the class/race (or gender/race) nexus, 
especially in regard to the political economy of the American South; and (3) 
analyses of the impact of racial attitudes and racism on political beliefs and policy 
preferences (Manza, 2000).  Indeed, the racial/ethnic dimensions and correlates of 
urban politics are and have long been numerous, varied, and interconnected 
(Hero, 2005).   
Research generated during the 1960s and 1970s consistently revealed 
blacks less satisfied than whites with urban services (Durand, 1976; Rossi, Berk, 
& Eidson, 1974; Schuman & Gruenberg, 1972). This research taps into the 
broader and compelling question of what difference an increasing Latino 
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(Hispanic) population makes, focusing specifically on citizen satisfaction within 
public service delivery in local government. The subject has gained currency in 
light of the tremendous growth and geographic dispersion of the Latino origin 
population in the last two decades (U.S. Census Bureau, 2000). Concretely, the 
question has implications for the literature on Latino assimilation (Stone & 
McQuillan, 2007; Gimenez, 1998; Moran, 1997; Chavez, 1991), socioeconomic 
and political development (Dutwin, et al., 2005; Leal, et al., 2005; de la Garza 
2004; 2001; Cavalcanti & Schleef, 2001), the racial/ethnic divide (Hispanic 
Business, 2006), and matters pertaining to inter-group relations in an increasingly 
multi-ethnic America (Huntington, 2004; de la Garza, et al., 1991). It is equally 
clear, at least in the short- to medium run that the most penetrating effects of 
Latino demographic change manifest at the immediate community level. In 
addressing this research domain, the general proposition is that Latino population 
growth will alter local service delivery either by the differential choice of Latinos 
or through Latino willingness to pay for services.    
Because of residential segregation and discrimination, Latinos have 
experienced higher levels of poverty relative to Anglos (Santiago & Wilder, 
1991). These factors equally account for inadequate public services relative to 
non-Hispanic whites (Claassen, 2004). While that deprivation has been both 
absolute and relative, the fact that most Latinos are aware that things could not 
only be better, but that they are actually superior “uptown” is the key to linking 
Gurr’s (1969) relative deprivation thesis to Latino demand for urban public 
 19 
services.  While Gurr and his contemporaries (e.g., King, 2003) examine relative 
deprivation and its linkage to political violence, other analysts articulate the 
significance of relative deprivation to group demand-protest (Fox, 2001; McVeigh 
and Smith, 1999; Browning, Marshall, & Tabb, 1986). Relative deprivation 
should broaden Latino demand for services, even if that means increasing taxes 
and other user fees. As Claassen has aptly noted, “a group that has experienced 
life with public services that lag qualitatively behind those available to Anglos is 
more likely to desire increasing social services spending” (2004: 617).  
The relative deprivation thesis, critically pertinent to anticipating Anglo-
Latino differences generally, is particularly germane to explaining those 
differences in Phoenix. Latinos now comprise 42 percent of the population of 
Phoenix (U.S. Census Bureau, 2005). However, that population is fairly 
residentially segregated (dissimilarity index with Anglos=60%).
   
When Phoenix 
switched from at-large to district election in 1983 (Luckingham, 1989), partly in 
response to demand-protest from the minority community, Latinos constituted 
36.1 percent of Council District #8, 35.9 percent of Council District #7, and 16.2 
percent of Council District #4 (The Rose Institute, 1983). In no other of the 
remaining five districts did the Latino population reach more than seven percent 
of the total. By 2000, Latinos had attained a majority in all three council districts, 
as follows: District #7, 63.5%; District #8, 58.6%; and District #4, 58.2% (U.S. 
Census Bureau, 2000b). Even with some of these seemingly “safe” majorities in 
place, Latinos still lack representation on the Phoenix city council.  While a 
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number of explanations are pertinent here, including the recurrent theme of the 
legal status of many Latinos, their “newness” that makes networking difficult, 
their youthfulness and their lack of economic resources to cultivate and advance a 
coherent political agenda (de la Garza, 2004), the absence of Latino councilors at 
city hall in a city where Latinos now comprise almost one-half of the total 
population is most salient. Moreover, Phoenix’s council districts with heavy 
Latino concentrations lag well behind others on every quality-of-life indicator. 
Specifically, districts 4-5 and 7-8 are plagued by lower household incomes, lower 
educational attainment, higher unemployment, higher poverty levels, and lower 
property values and ownership. 
Latino-focused research has underscored the particularly important 
implications of institutional design in determining political access for distinct 
segments of the American polity (Jones-Correa, 2005).  Current institutional 
design provides limited Latino input towards the influence of policy decision 
making and can have strong implications towards the accessibility of municipal 
service delivery.  In fact, it is now widely speculated that the next decisive 
political realignment will be orchestrated by the “rising Latino tide” (Leal, et al. 
2005; Gimpel & Kaufmann, 2001).  
Blacks (African-Americans), Latinos and other minorities share unique 
experiences that must not be overlooked when reviewing evaluations of 
government performance and service.  A racial / ethnic diversity approach brings 
careful theoretical attention to emerging groups and issues in state and local 
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issues, given that a central characteristic of states is their racial and ethnic 
diversity; or lack thereof (Hero and Tolbert, 1996).  While racial and ethnic 
diversity is important in itself, it may also be used to bridge economic, political, 
and cultural perspectives on state politics (Fitzpatrick & Hero, 1988, Dye, 1969).  
In addition, race plays a role in citizen satisfaction when neighborhood, 
socioeconomic status, and trust in government variables are controlled, especially 
in the case of police, fire protection, and parks services (Van Ryzin et al, 2004, 
p.625.)  
GENDER 
Social scientists exited the 20
th
 Century attentive to the subject of the 
gender gap (see Carroll, 2003; Schlesinger & Heldman, 2001; Norris, 2003; 
Peterson & Runyan, 1999; Carroll, Dodson, & Mandel, 1991 for a more 
comprehensive review). While the breadth of scholarship spans the social 
sciences, the primary focus here concerns public policy orientation and gender 
variances.  No matter how small the differences in particular policy spheres 
(Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995, 251; Burns & Schumaker, 1988, 1987) the 
notion that women are “different” is the primary fixture of gender scholarship and 
forms the nucleus of the gender research tradition (Burrell, 1997).  
For political scientists, at least, the women-are-different paradigm 
appeared destined for an early demise given foundational debates on the bases of 
potential gender differences as well as sketchy data documenting actual gender 
disparities (see extensive literature cited in Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995, 
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252-254; Shapiro & Mahajan, 1986; Pomper, 1975). However, all that changed in 
the late-1970s, early 1980s, with the emergence of compelling scholarship (e.g., 
Gilligan, 1982; Githens & Prestage, 1977; Welch, 1977; Chodorow, 1974) which, 
presumably, anchored more firmly the sources of potential gender differences 
even in public life. Decidedly, where such gender differences were minimal, even 
doubtful, some analysts came to take them for granted (Verba, Schlozman, & 
Brady, 1995, 252-254). 
Earlier research on gender differences in policy orientation was scoped out 
on a broad theoretical framework.  It suggested that women are more liberal and 
progressive in their orientation than men. In time, it became apparent that this 
“straight-jacket” ideological framework is both too simplistic and inadequate for 
describing gender differences (Burns & Schumaker, 1987; Shapiro & Mahajan, 
1986). As Burns and Schumaker (1987, 139) have explained, citing Jennings and 
Farah (1981: 473), Sapiro (1983: 153), and Baxter and Lansing (1983:57), this 
‘single liberal-conservative ideological dimension implied gender differences on a 
wide variety of policy fronts notwithstanding the fact that women may be more 
liberal than men only on some specific policy concepts addressed in liberal or 
conservative ideology’. The premise is, to make any sense at all, investigations of 
gender differences must be grounded in the realities of men and women’s lives.  
For instance, it has been suggested for decades that men are more active 
politically than women.  However, grounded research has clarified the true 
picture: it is now apparent that men are more active politically only to the extent 
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that the kinds of activities women typically engage are either not classified as 
“public” and “political” at all, overlooked, or dismissed altogether as 
“nonpolitical activity” (Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995).  
The particular rendition may vary, but the central theme on grounding 
gender research in the realities of men and women’s lives is unmistakable. 
Considering the literature in its entirety, the cleanest rendition would read as 
follows: from birth through adulthood, males and females are exposed to 
psychological and developmental stimuli that shape their experiences, 
worldviews, and social expectations differently (e.g., Blocker & Eckberg, 1989; 
Burns & Schumaker, 1987; Shapiro &Mahajan, 1986; Sapiro, 1983). By design, 
men’s stimuli prod them, consistently, toward the model of the “economic man” 
fraught with power, competition, and economic rationality, the kind that promotes 
social Darwinism, market-based policies, and desires for government to be run 
like a “business.” Conversely, women’s stimuli channel them, systematically, 
toward nurturing, sharing, cooperation, egalitarianism and compassion, eventually 
making them likely advocates for what some Republicans in the late 1980s, and 
early 1990s dubbed a “kinder and gentler” dispensation.  
To the extent that gender differences are anticipated on policy choices, the 
grounding approach expects those differences to be driven by these gender-
specific stimuli, including how the sexes view the role of government generally, 
redistributive justice, use of force, public assistance, ‘compassion issues’ and 
community protection. For instance, Burns and Schumaker (1987, 138) found 
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women to be more supportive than men of public welfare and neighborhood 
protection against economic development and concluded that the “public-and-
private-spheres” theoretical perspective (the grounding approach) provides a 
better guide than ideology to gender differences on local policy concepts. Shapiro 
and Mahajan (1986, 24) found that gender differences in preferences toward 
policies involving the use of force remained moderately large between the 1960s 
and 1980s and concluded that “the salience of issues has increased greatly for 
women, and as a result differences in preferences have increased in ways 
consistent with the interests of women and the intensions of the women’s 
movement.” 
Scholars may have neglected gender differences in ideology in part 
because past research concluded that Americans do not think in ideological terms, 
that is, ideological identities are the product of political beliefs (Norrander & 
Wilcox, 2008).  The conventional wisdom is that the gender gap in ideology has 
reversed from the 1950’s, whereby today women are more liberal than men 
(Inglehart & Norris, 2003).  Over time, men and women have had increasingly 
different views regarding key policy preferences.  If policy preferences are the 
source of the gender gap, then the most likely causes of a gender gap in ideology 
are issues where there is a real and growing gender gap, such as attitudes toward 
the role of government in solving problems such as poverty (Kaufmann, & 
Petrocik, 1999).  Kaufmann (2002) reported that for women, gender-specific 
issues such as reproductive rights, gender equality and equal rights for gays and 
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lesbians became more central to partisanship, whereas for men, social welfare 
issues continue to dominate their partisan ties.   
AGE  
 Age of housing, population growth, extent of suburbanization and 
proportion of the population above 65 contribute significantly to the explanation 
of age segregation (LaGlory et al, 1980).  Earlier research found urban elderly 
generally concentrating in central cities within areas that are older and have lower 
housing values (Zelinsky, 1966; Culter & Harootyan, 1975).  Generally speaking, 
compared to renters, homeowners tend to move less often because they have 
greater financial and psychological commitments to their current residences.  
And, because families with children have a stronger desire for spacious living, 
they tend to prefer homeownership.  However, as the family size later contracts, 
the need for space declines, thus the aged tend to prefer smaller and cheaper 
residential spaces (LaGlory et al., 1980).  Earlier research confirms that the 
elderly have been a relatively non-mobile group who generally remain behind as 
neighborhoods change (Goldscheider, 1966).  Additionally, LaGlory et al., (1980) 
found that residential segregation of the elderly was a function of the housing 
market, where small and/or fixed incomes reflected smaller housing options.  
New research examines the interaction of age amongst other variables in 
contributing to the explanation of continued residential segregation.  Clark (2009) 
found that income and age play important defining roles in explaining the 
willingness of whites to move into racial/ethnically mixed neighborhoods.   
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NEIGHBORHOOD EFFECTS  
 
Generally, a neighborhood may be defined as the aggregation of dwellings 
and the physical, social, political, and economic systems that bind these dwellings 
together (Connerly & Marans, 1988).  The organization of the built environment, 
growth patterns, and local and historical traditions can affect how different 
racial/ethnic groups regard one another and are variables that contribute to 
neighborhood development (Lewis and Hamilton, 2011).   
Much of the research gathered prior to the 1970s focused on the 
identification of the determinants of local policy outputs (Lineberry & Welch, Jr., 
1974).  While empirical measurement focused on per capita tax and expenditure 
levels, a call for redirection shifted focus to distribution.  Lasswell (1948) began 
this discussion with his “Who gets what, when, and how” approach, while Easton 
(1965) fleshed out the issues around “authoritative allocation of values.”   
 The Kerner Commission (1968) cited inadequate distribution of urban 
services as a cause of many urban riots that took place in the mid-1960s.  At that 
time, whether real or perceived, inequitable distribution and inadequate provision 
of services contributed to high levels of dissatisfaction with local government and 
reinforced feelings of alienation within certain populations (Lineberry & Welch, 
Jr., 1974).  During this time period, inadequate urban service distribution 
underscored racial discrimination in many regions and has thus left a legacy for 
city managers to change.  Lineberry and Welch, Jr., (1974) outlined and discussed 
three important dimensions that deter the collection of data with respect to 
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distribution of public services.  These include output measurement problems of 
public services, choosing a distribution standard, and availability of the 
distribution data.   
 Research throughout the 1980s focused on objective and subjective 
measurements of service delivery and satisfaction (Brown & Coulter, 1983).  
Throughout the 1990s and 2000s the importance of citizen satisfaction became a 
‘closing the loop’ practice for many municipalities (Miller & Miller, 1991; Van 
Ryzin, 2004, 2007).  While much of the “who gets what, when, and how” had 
been answered, questions shifted towards how satisfied citizens are with what 
they are getting.   
Today, an individual’s choice of residency is often determined by its 
proximity to available jobs, and affordable housing.  State and local government 
policies frequently establish a community’s development by determining levels of 
job growth and development practices within the area.  Specifically, local 
governments influence the location of business growth, distribution of tax and 
business support incentives, and infrastructure investment.  These specific 
measures determine an area’s industrial locations and thus influence access to 
different types of jobs to which persons of different racial groups have access, and 
hence opportunities to earn higher or lower incomes (Ihlanfeldt & Sjoquist, 1991; 
Martin, 1997; as cited in Lewis & Hamilton, 2011).   
Further, resource allocation to neighborhood communities varies and can 
be influenced by citizen need, political influence, and community need.  Lewis 
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and Hamilton (2011) found that levels of racial disparity in income and housing 
within regions may be related to underlying structures of government that mediate 
the distribution of local resources.  While neighborhood composition can be 
influenced by variables such as zoning ordinances, neighborhood planning 
boards, impact fees, local sales and property tax, and private sector interest, 
ultimately, people from different social groups may or may not decide to live 
together.  Nonetheless, the nation’s history as well as the sociological evidence 
suggests that sorting people along ethnic, religious, or racial lines contributes to 
social and economic disparities (Lewis & Hamilton, 2011).   
Historically, residential segregation has contributed to shared community 
experiences within each segregated community.  Lewis and Hamilton (2011) 
suggest that residential segregation has been a more enduring social construct 
than has any particular set of public policies.  Residential segregation can be 
defined as the degree to which two or more groups live separately from one 
another in different parts of an urban environment.  The most used measurement 
of residential segregation is the index of dissimilarity (Duncan & Duncan, 1955; 
Taeuber & Taeuber, 1965; and Massey & Denton, 1988).  While this index holds 
no mathematical relationship to the minority composition of the population, it 
may have a behavioral relationship. (Lieberson, 1980).  Nevertheless, residential 
segregation can be characterized as a multidimensional construct that has five 
dimensions; evenness, exposure, concentration, centralization, and clustering and 
each having their own respective indexes.   
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 Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, sharp improvements in racial attitudes 
among whites occurred.  This timeframe also saw the development of a 
flourishing black middle-class.  By the 1980s, more blacks than ever had access to 
the levels of income and economic resources that have permitted other groups to 
achieve spatial assimilation in American society (Massey & Denton, 1987).  
Finally, job creation and population growth of the 1970s flourished into suburban 
areas, often leaving minorities segregated into depressed inner-city neighborhoods 
(as cited in Massey & Denton, 1987).   
Massey and Denton (1987) examined residential segregation trends of the 
1970s and 1980s and attempted to account for interurban variation in segregation.  
Massey, White, and Phua (1996) analyzed Census data from 1980 and 1990 to 
replicate the 1980 study.  The results yielded empirical validation of the five-
dimensional scheme for determining residential segregation.   Johnson, Poulsen 
and Forrest (2007) used Census data from 1980, 1990, and 2000 to recreate the 
original Massey and Denton study.  The results yielded unique findings for 
various racial and ethnic groupings.  During this timeframe, a district pattern for 
African-Americans emerged.  Unevenness, isolation, and clustering were evident 
throughout the period, however, whereas in 1980 concentration was linked to the 
unevenness dimension, in 1990 and 2000, it was closely linked to centralization 
(Johnson, Poulsen, & Forrest (p. 490.) 
Immigration of racial and ethnic minorities’ remains an important variable 
and its impact on residential segregation is two-fold.  First it can stimulate 
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negative attitudes of natives towards immigrant groups, and second, it can create 
concentrated ethnic immigrant enclaves.  For example, in 1900, about 80% of the 
U.S. foreign born were from Europe, but by 2000 this figure only represented 
16% of U.S. foreign born immigrants (Timberlake et al., 2011).  By 2000, over 
half of all U.S. foreign born immigrants were from Latin America, and over 25% 
were from Asia (Malone et al., 2003).  Current scholarship remains interested in 
the spatial assimilation (Massey and Mullan, 1984) of immigrants which includes 
access to the suburbs (see Alba & Logan 1991; Logan & Alba, 1993; Massey & 
Denton, 1988; Schneider & Phelan, 1993).  This theory posits that minority 
groups experience a process toward residential contact within a society’s majority 
group in part by adopting the language and cultural practices of that group 
(Massey & Denton, 1985).   
Beginning post World War II and throughout the 1950s and 1960s, Anglo 
suburbanization rates grew very rapidly, partly fueled by federal government 
FHA and VA programs that supported Anglo and suppressed Black 
suburbanization (Massey & Denton, 1993).  These efforts supported what 
academic scholarship referred to as a “chocolate city” and “vanilla suburbs” 
(Farley et al., 1978). Timberlake et al., (2011) found that generally, Anglos are 
the most suburbanized racial/ethnic group, followed by Asians and Latinos, with 
African Americans lagging, although experiencing increasing rates of 
suburbanization since 1960 (p. 219).   Studies that expanded Farley et al., (1978) 
examined residential preferences of racial and ethnic groups.  This research 
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showed that African Americans preferred integrated residential settings, while 
Anglos preferred majority Anglo residential neighborhoods (Clark, 1991, 1992; 
Farley, Fielding, & Krysan, 1997).  Hispanics and Asians also routinely express 
preferences for neighborhoods for which they are the majority presence (Clark, 
2009).   
More recent scholarship has pointed out that prior research considered 
racial groups as having economic homogeneity.  Significant policy interest 
differences exist between low and upper income Blacks and Hispanics who may 
have different views on redistributive income or housing policies (Dawson, 1995).  
Lewis and Hamilton (2011) consider how patterns of residential segregation and 
opportunity are different for different income groups, and thus local government 
structure may have disparate impact on different income levels, even among a 
single racial group.   
Neighborhood composition plagued by the residue of racial and ethnic 
segregation has influenced citizen evaluation of government performance and 
service.  Studies that examine neighborhood satisfaction typically review one of 
two categories; individual household characteristics and/or neighborhood quality 
characteristics (Basolo & Strong, 2002). Individual household characteristics 
include standard SES factors including age, race, education, gender, marital 
status, children, tenure of residence, etc.  Neighborhood quality can be defined 
through agents such as physical environment, access to various activity nodes, 
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local services and facilities and the neighborhood’s sociocultural settings 
(Connerly and Marans, 1988).   
The ‘social access model’ (Williams, 1971) explains the relationship 
between neighborhood characteristics and urban service delivery.  Accordingly, 
residents who can afford to live in neighborhoods with higher levels of access to 
municipal services will have a greater value and review of local government.  The 
literature has generated several studies that have reviewed this relationship – see 
Bolotin and Cingranelli (1983); Lineberry (1977); Antunes and Plumlee, (1977).  
Other studies have included examining the effects of both individual and 
neighborhood characteristics on citizens’ evaluation of services (Durand, 1976; 
Lovrich & Taylor, 1976).   
Lineberry (1977) suggested that neighborhood characteristics might lead 
to different service evaluations.  Neighborhoods that boast low crime rates, 
exemplary schools, quality libraries and parks, and high property values, are 
highly sought after, thus creating a demand to be a part of that community.  Once 
in, neighborhood pressures to conform can generate a united sense of community 
pride.  Research indicates that neighborhood cohesiveness has an impact on 
citizen values of municipal services.  For example, Brown and Coulter (1983) 
found that the belief that service is better in one’s neighborhood, rather than in 
surrounding ones, makes a citizen more satisfied with municipal police service.   
Physical and social disorder can negatively affect an individual’s 
evaluation of satisfaction in one’s community (Woldoff, 2002).  Thus, 
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neighborhood satisfaction is typically seen as an important ingredient in a 
resident’s quality of life; personal views of one’s housing environment may affect 
the way one interacts within the community (Lu, 1999).   
The inter-group contact hypothesis states that interactions among different 
groups will influence the attitudes and behavior between members of these 
different groups.  This literature has examined two distinct forms; context and 
behavioral.  The contextual contact literature finds that Anglos residing in areas 
with high concentrations of minority populations have significantly more negative 
attitudes toward minorities and minority based public policies than Anglos 
residing in areas with low concentrations of minority populations (Stein, Post & 
Rinden, 2000).  Context here is the size of the minority population within a 
specific geographical area; i.e., neighborhood.  This literature suggests that 
context exerts a stronger impact on Anglo attitudes towards Blacks than towards 
Hispanics and Asians.  Forbes (1997) explains this finding as a function of 
cultural differences; that is, most Hispanics identify their race as Anglo, and this 
association narrows the cultural differences between Anglos and Hispanics as 
opposed to Anglos and blacks.   
The behavioral contact literature finds that inter-group contacting among 
majority and minority populations significantly reduces prejudicial attitudes and 
opinions about minorities and minority based policies.  (Stein, Post &  Rinden, 
2000).  Based on a review of inter-group studies, Forbes (1997) concluded that 
“…liking and association go together…” that is, inter group contact often leads to 
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positive attitudes between groups.  Variables contributing to this association 
include contact opportunities via work, leisure, residential, frequency of contact, 
etc.  It stands to reason that the ethnic composition of a city or metropolitan areas 
determines the opportunity for inter group engagement.   
Sigelman and Welch (1993) and Stein, Post, and Riden (2000) have 
examined the interaction of contextual and behavioral measures of the inter group 
contact hypothesis.  Sigelman and Welch (1993) found that both contact and 
respondent perception of the racial makeup of the neighborhood are positively 
related to white and black attitudes and perceptions of race as well as black/white 
social relations.  Stein, Post, and Riden (2000) found that the interaction between 
the behavioral and contextual measures of contact provides a more realistic test of 
the inter group hypothesis because it accounts for both individual behavior and 
the environment in which contact occurs.  In addition, their findings concluded 
that contact facilitates contact, whereby the positive effect of interaction of 
behavioral and contextual measures of inter group contact demonstrates that 
contact can reduce the negative consequences of context.   
 
GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE  
Local governments are determined by citizen preferences for their size and 
capacities.  As Rubin (1998) explained, cities deliver services to citizens directly, 
which creates the image that taxpayers are spending money to buy the bundle of 
services they desire from localities.  For decades, the academic conversation 
concerning the impact of government structure over municipal expenditure levels 
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has remained unsettled.   Early literature established the linkage between local 
government structure and its fiscal policy, however, more recent contributions 
have suggested otherwise.  Arguably, new and more complex forms of local 
government structures are contributing to this change.  Nevertheless, the review 
of local government remains at the academic forefront given that it represents the 
most responsive level of government, that is, the most visible relationship 
between citizens and elected officials.   
Over the years, analysis concerning the form of local government has been 
an area of vast study.  Traditionally, these dichotomous forms of local 
government have been categorized into two primary structures; council-mayor, 
council-city manager.  According to the ICMA Municipal Handbook (2010), the 
most popular form of government is the council-city manager form.  Fifty-four 
percent (54%) of municipalities with a population between 5,000 and 250,000 
residents are governed under the council-city manager model.    
Extensive review over the political authority within locals governments 
have focused on the relationship between institutional structure and fiscal 
spending (Booms, 1966; Lineberry and Fowler, 1967; Lyons, 1978; Dye and 
Garcia, 1978).  These initial contributions provided early empirical evidence that 
cities with council-manager structures spent less than their mayor-council 
counterparts. 
Council-mayor cities are based on the concept of separation of powers 
where the council (legislative) and mayor (executive) divide the political 
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authority.  The literature further reviews this structure by distinguishing the 
strength of the mayor.  A strong mayor structure represents strong executive 
authority, whereby veto power over council actions and the authority to appoint 
and remove department heads are often actualized.  A weak mayor structure 
represents a more disbursed and fragmented power structure between the mayor 
and council (Duvall, 1999; see Desantis and Renner, 2002 for further analysis of 
power arrangements within the council-mayor structure.) 
   Council-city manager forms consolidate political power exclusively to 
the council, who collectively hire a city manager to administer city operations.  
This dichotomy model of the politics-administration relationship assumes that 
local elected officials and appointed administrators bear separate responsibilities 
in the policy process: making policy and carrying out policy (Zhang and Feiock, 
2009).  Numerous studies have examined the dichotomy model to clarify and 
reveal the extent of policy formation carried out by city managers.  Alternatives to 
the dichotomy model were developed throughout the 1980s and 1990s.  Svara’s 
dichotomy-duality model (1985) suggested that elected officials should dominate 
in the formulation of mission of local government and managers should exert 
control over the administration and management side.  Svara (2006) describes the 
evolution of the dichotomy-duality model to a complimentary model, whereby 
“…administrators accept the control of elected officials and elected officials 
respect what administrators do and how they do it.  At the same time there is 
interdependency and reciprocal influence between elected officials and 
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administrators who fill distinct but overlapping roles in policy and 
administration.” (p. 1081). The Montjoy and Watson (1995) model emphasizes 
the city managers’ policy making role.   DeSantis and Renner (2002) assert that 
the council-manager arrangement can be further subcategorized based on the 
formal authority provided to the mayor by the city charter.   
Today, local government structures represent more hybrid structures that 
are multidimensional (see Carr and Karuppusamy, 2010  for a detailed review of 
the literature)  Newer approaches in measuring municipal structures are derived 
from the work of H. George Frederickson, Gary Johnson, and Curtis Wood 
(2004).  Whereas previous efforts have focused on how to add categories to the 
mayor-council and council-manager forms, their approach is to identify a third 
form of government they contend is a blending of the two forms (Carr and 
Karuppusamy, 2010, p. 214)  As such, Deno and Mehay (1987), Hayes and Chang 
(1990), Jung (2006) and Craw (2008) have provided analysis that shows no 
evidence to support the claim that municipal structure impacts local fiscal 
decisions.   Carr and Karuppusamy (2010) reconfirm these more recent findings 
by also revealing the importance of social and economic context in explaining 
differences in city spending.  Specifically, factors such as total population, per 
capita personal income and intergovernmental revenues are revealed as consistent 
predictors of per capita expenditures.    
Local governments also operate in a very seemingly complex and 
multilayer system whereby various state level political and legal institutions 
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influence and constrain policymaking at the local level (as cited in Fernandez, 
Ryu, and Brudney, 2008).  Such constraints are tax and expenditure limitations 
(TEL) that can shift fiscal responsibilities from a local to state jurisdictions.  A 
local government TEL is a restriction imposed by states on local governments 
(Shadbegian, 2003).    Local government TELs tend to have a negative effect on 
local revenues and expenditures while stimulating state direct expenditures and 
grants to local governments (Fernandez, Ryu, & Brudney, 2008).     
INFRASTRUCTURE, LOCATION, PRIVATIZATION AND 
CONTRACTING OUT  
Public administration theory focuses primarily on the nature of the service, 
yet broader theoretical frameworks which focus on geography, economics, and 
planning allows for the consideration of the industrial organization and the 
structure of the market (Hefetz and Warner, 2011- see citation for detailed review 
of literature).  When reviewing service delivery, municipal infrastructure is 
examined to determine the capacity in which services can be actualized, given its 
geographical size and population while remaining cost efficient.  For example, a 
new city needing to establish fire and emergency services may determine that 
given its population, geographical size and location, it is cheaper to outsource the 
service in lieu of heavy operational costs, large equipment investments and other 
start-up costs.   However, as the city’s population grows, the city may plan when 
it is time to bring this service in-house.     
Over the last thirty years, municipalities have implemented various means 
of privatizing the delivery of public services.  This predominant theme of “new 
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public management’ called for a shrinking of government size along with a strong 
reliance on market based services, which ultimately yields a presumably more 
efficient government (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992; Savas, 1987).  Nonetheless, the 
key variable assumed within market based services is competition, and lack of 
competition thus undermines a government’s ability for cost savings.   
To no surprise, rural governments have difficulties finding competitive 
market based solutions for the delivery of public services.  Additionally, rural 
communities have lower public interest in service delivery and its smaller 
population size usually results in rural governments providing fewer services 
(Hefetz and Warner, 2011).  Needing to gain economies of scale, often rural 
governments look to intergovernmental or interjurisdictional agreements as an 
alternative.   
Other motivations factor into the privatization decision as well.  These 
may include such aspects as government not having the expertise and/or 
experience in a particular service area, or the necessary equipment to perform a 
service. Evidence of real cost savings actualized through privatization remains 
contradictory, but the practice continues unabated primarily due to increased 
practical and political pressures (Boyne, 1998; Brudney, Fernandez, Rhu, & 
Wright, 2005; Savas, 2005).   
Using ICMA survey data, Greene (2002) identified 59 discrete municipal 
services that cities have outsourced, thus exposing that no city service is ‘safe’ 
from privatization.  More recently, empirical reviews of cost savings between 
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public and private service delivery of specific services is becoming more robust 
within the literature.  For example, in reviewing the contracting out of solid waste 
services, evidence supports no significant cost savings between public delivery 
and private contractor delivery of solid waste services (Bae, 2010;  Bel & Costas, 
2006; Callen & Thomas, 2001).   
Various structural elements play a role in determining whether or not 
contracting out is a feasible option for cities.  These elements can include political 
and ideological factors, managerial factors, fiscal stress, supply and cost factors, 
and contract management capacity.  Contracting out also presents potential issues 
such as agency problems, adverse selection, and moral hazard that result from 
information asymmetry and opportunism (Fernandez, Ryu, and Brudney, 2008).   
Transaction costs as related to service delivery characteristics also figures 
importantly into the analysis of the public sector.  Within the literature, 
transaction costs have been used to explain government’s decision to contract out 
(Nelson, 1997; Sclar, 2000).  Transaction costs in the market have been used in 
explaining decisions regarding service delivery choice (Bel and Fageda, 2008, 
2009; Brown and Potoski, 2003; Hefetz and Warner, 2004).  Coase’s seminal 
work (1937) outlined transaction costs as a means in understanding why firms 
exist.  Williamson’s work (1991, 1999) gave specific attention to transaction cost 
within the public sector.  Combining the Coase and Williamson theories suggests 
that the decision to make or buy a service will be determined primarily by service 
characteristics: (1) the level of specific physical infrastructure or technical 
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expertise and (2) difficulty in contract specification and monitoring (Hefetz and 
Warner, 2011).   
Empirical research conducted in the 1980s and 1990s suggested that 
political consideration, specifically, political ideology and party identification had 
a significant impact on the decision to privatize service delivery (see Fernandez, 
Ryu, and Brudney 2008 for a detailed review of the literature).  Political 
conservatives touted privatization as a means for reducing the size of the public 
sector, limiting the power of the state, and bringing forth a sense of 
competitiveness and productivity to public bureaucracies (Savas, 2000).  
However, more recent empirical evidence produced within the last ten years 
reveal that political and ideological consideration have little or no effect as to 
whether or not the service delivery is contracted out by the state (Brudney et al. 
2005;  Hefetz and Warner 2004; Brown and Poroski, 2003).   
Managerial considerations such as collective bargaining, ex ante 
management, council-administrator/manager, monitoring capacity, as well as 
contract management capacity are now scrutinized more closely.  Recent 
literature indicates that contract management capacity is a crucial variable for 
successful privatization by allowing governments to plan effectively and oversee 
contracting out by allowing public managers to monitor and regulate (where 
needed) contractor behavior (Fernandez, Ryu, and Brudney, 2008; Hefetz and 
Warner, 2004; Brown and Poroski, 2003.) 
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 Despite this now prevailing model, innovative deviations exist and are in 
use.  For example, newly incorporated cities have adopted an approach to almost 
exclusive contracting out to private firms while maintaining a staff of high-level 
professional administrators.  Such examples include Weston, FL; Centennial, CO; 
and Sandy Springs, GA (Bradbury and Waechter, 2009).  It is noteworthy that all 
three examples incorporate the use of private sector provision of public services, 
along with interjurisdictional and/or intergovernmental agreements.  Conversely, 
several small towns have adopted a different deviation, whereby, in house 
government employees perform and deliver most services, all while the high-level 
administrator positions are contracted out.  Examples include a variety of North 
Carolina cities such as Kitty Hawk, Shelby, Mount Pleasant, and more.  Local 
government scholars have also identified a sub-category of contracting out called 
interjurisdictional, or intergovernmental agreements (Bradbury and Waechter, 
2009.)  These agreements typically consist of “interlocal service contracts 
between two or more units of government in which one pays the other for the 
delivery of the service to the residents of the jurisdiction of the paying 
government” (McGuire, 2004, p. 193).    
 
TAX BASE AND BUDGET  
Historically, government budgeting within the United States has been 
based on the assumption that public revenues and expenditures would 
continuously grow.  This premise was true, up until the 1970s, when state and 
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local governments underwent ‘cutback management.’  Levine (1979, p. 180) 
defines cutback management as “…the management of organizational change 
towards lower levels of resource consumption and organizational activity.”  From 
the 1970s to the 2000s, government response has been to increase taxes, and/or 
cut services; neither of which represents popular decisions.  In addition, many 
state and local governments are mandated by law to maintain balanced budgets.   
In establishing how a local government can generate revenue, its structure 
needs to be understood; that is, is the local government a city or a special district.  
Cities/municipalities (the terms are interchangeable) are general purpose local 
governments that can provide a broad range of services to their community.  
Generally, municipalities are funded through state governments, and are able to 
levy property and sales taxes.  Many cities today rely solely on property tax as 
their main revenue source.  Generally speaking, property tax assessments can lag 
behind the true value of the house, thus leaving city budgets in a vulnerable 
condition.  The fallout from the current U.S. housing crisis (subprime loans, 
foreclosures, declines in real property values) continues to negatively plague city 
budgets and reinforces this vulnerability.   Levying a sales tax can also take 
several months for city sales tax revenues to reflect changes in consumption, 
largely because of collection and administrative issues (Hoene and Pagano, 2009).   
A special district is an independent local government that generally 
performs only a few local government functions and is not accountable to other 
governments.  Generally speaking, revenue sources of special districts are 
 44 
comprised of user charges, utility revenues and federal aid.  A critical difference 
between municipalities and special districts is the type of bonds they are able to 
issue.  
Recent cutback management practices by local governments have included 
hiring freezes, employee layoffs, furloughs, delays and cancellations of planned 
infrastructure projects, reduction in services, and tax increases.  These tax 
increases have come in various forms and include increases in fees (vehicle 
registration, impact and development, etc.), personal income tax, property tax, 
sales tax, business tax, and alcohol and tobacco taxes.   
Levine (1979) articulated four major causes of and responses to city fiscal 
stress and decline and includes: political vulnerability, organizational atrophy, 
problem depletion, and environmental entropy.  Political vulnerability and 
organizational atrophy were envisioned as internal forces that threatened to force 
an organization to restructure or eliminate services or programs.  Problem 
depletion and environmental atrophy represent external threats to organizational 
fitness (as cited in Scorsone and Plerhoples, 2010, p. 179).   
 
PUBLIC CHOICE LITERATURE 
 To understand the early classics of public choice, one must understand the 
origins laid forth by two French mathematicians, Jean-Charles de Borda (1781) 
and the Marquis de Condorcet (1785).  Condorcet’s contributions are two-fold, 
discovering the existence of cycling and proving a theorem about juries, which is 
now called the Condorcet jury theorem.  The problem of cycling exists when 
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using the simple majority rule that an alternative x can lose to y in a vote between 
the two, y can lose to another alternative z, but z will also lose to x.  The issue 
then is how does a community decide among three alternatives, when a cycle 
exists?  Many contributions to the literature have analyzed the implication of 
cycles.   The Condorcet jury theorem rests on three assumptions and has produced 
a justification for making collective decisions with a simple majority rule, and for 
the institution of democracy itself.  Condorcet’s work left many modern theorists 
questions to struggle with; Do individuals actually share common interests? Are 
voters sufficiently informed to make informed choices representing the majority’s 
preferences?  What voting rule should be used to aggregate these preferences?   
 Borda was more critical of the simple majority rule and instead provided a 
different measure of assigning preferences.  The Borda rule states that if there are 
n possible outcomes to a collective decision, each voter assigns a one to the most 
preferred choice, a two to the second most preferred choice, and so on.  Then the 
scores are tabulated, and the choice that has the lowest score is the winner.  Also, 
when n >2, the problem of cycling is avoided.    
It is said that Duncan Black (1948a,b), James Buchanan (1949), and 
Kenneth Arrow (1950) got the public choice ball rolling so to speak.  Duncan 
Black’s two articles take up the problem of cycling under the simple majority rule 
and provide a proof to the famous median voter theorem.  This theorem has been 
frequently invoked to describe equilibria in theoretical studies and has been the 
analytical foundation for much of the empirical work in public choice.  
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Buchanan’s work prior to 1962 was important; however it is his co-authored book 
with Gordon Tullock, Calculus of Consent that permanently affirmed his identity 
with the public choice literature.  Here it is important to note the literature 
contribution that provides distinction between the constitutional stage of 
collective decision making in which the voting rules and other institutions of 
democracy are selected, and the applications of these rules to the actual work of 
making collective choices.  Arrow’s theorem demonstrated that no procedure for 
aggregating individual preferences could generate a social ordering while 
satisfying five axioms. His work has generated controversy along with a 
substantial body of literature.  Anthony Downs, ( 1957) a student of Arrow, 
introduced a mode of analysis of competition using spatial modeling as well as 
developed the rational voter model that puts forth the concept that voters 
rationally choose to remain ignorant of most issues within an election.   
Other significant contributions include Mancur Olson’s Logic of 
Collective Action (1965) in which the ‘logic of collection action’ prevents 
individuals from voluntarily giving up their time and money to the provision of 
public goods thus creating the “free-rider problem,” Anne Krueger’s (1974) and 
Richard Posner’s (1975) works on rent seeking behaviors and its high social costs 
and William Niskanen’s (1971) work on bureaucracy, revealing that bureaucrats 
seek to maximize the size of their budgets and the respective implications of said 
behavior.  More contemporary literature examines political business cycles, 
minority governments, and focuses more on empirical testing of existing theories.   
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TIEBOUT 
 
 Initially, Tiebout offered a solution to the then-emergent theory of public 
goods and to Paul Samuelson’s (1954) conundrum over the various nature of 
public goods; i.e., how do governments address the issue of balance between 
citizen’s paying for and consuming public goods.  The Tiebout (1956) model 
presents a theoretical approach for examining the relationship between the level 
of expenditures for public goods and services, with citizen preferences for those 
goods and services.  This model is applied at the local level and provides the 
theoretical foundation to the public choice paradigm.  Ideally then, a citizen who 
chooses to live within a community does so because he or she is satisfied with the 
local level of public goods and services, and is satisfied with the tax rate that 
provides that level of public goods and services.   
 The Tiebout model makes a distinction with the institutional design of 
government viewing consolidated and fragmented governments differently.  
Accordingly, the model implies that satisfaction with local government in 
fragmented settings should not vary.  Citizens will receive different combinations 
of services at a variety of quality levels and tax prices, but they should all be 
equally satisfied because services received and taxes paid should closely mirror 
individual preferences (Kelleher and Lowery, 2002.)  In contrast, consolidated 
governments should produce greater variation in citizen satisfaction due to the 
mismatch of government’s limited service choices and citizens’ individual 
preferences.  Ultimately citizen dissatisfaction will arise.  When this occurs, 
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Tiebout concludes that the result is “voting with one’s feet” whereby citizens opt 
to move into another area and thus exit.     
 As with any theoretical model, assumptions are provided.  Implicitly 
embedded are assumptions about individuals that are important to institutional 
design recommendations.  Tiebout’s model (1956) stipulates the following 
assumptions:  
 
1. Consumer-voters are fully mobile to move from community to 
community.  Their decision to stay within a certain community 
demonstrates their preferences towards the local level of public goods 
provided. 
2. Consumer-voters have perfect knowledge of differences among revenue 
and expenditures of local governments that enable them to react to these 
differences. 
3. There are a large number of communities in which consumer-voters can 
choose to live. 
4. Restrictions due to employment opportunities are not considered. 
5. Public services supplied exhibit no external economies or diseconomies 
between communities. 
6. Some factors are fixed and therefore limit growth within a community’s 
size. 
7. Communities below an optimal size will seek out new residents to lower 
their existing average costs for public goods and services.  Those above 
the optimal size will do the opposite. 
 
 Mobility is a key factor within Tiebout’s model.  With this measure, 
Tiebout provides a solution to Samuelson’s (1954,1955,1958) argument that the 
market cannot correctly identify demand for collective goods ( Dowding and 
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John, 1994).  According to Tiebout, “The act of moving or failing to move is 
crucial.  Moving or failing to move replaced the usual market test of willingness 
to buy a good and reveals the consumer-voter’s demand for public goods.  Thus 
each locality has a revenue and expenditure pattern that reflects the desires of its 
residents (Tiebout, 1956, p. 420)   
  Pitfalls within these assumptions include not accounting for transaction 
costs of moving, as well as consumer-voter attentiveness to tax-service packages 
in other nearby communities.  Further, the Tiebout model never provided 
minimum levels of exiting to make the model work.  In other words, how many 
residents must move out of the community before local officials take note and 
respond to citizen preferences?  This aspect has made the model difficult to test 
empirically.   
  Building directly on Tiebout’s work, Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren (1961) 
emphasize the need to consolidate or reduce the number of local governments that 
serve urban areas.  Bish and Ostrom (1973) assert the need to create and maintain 
numerous local government units by offering a mix of local services within each 
urban area and thus maximize opportunities for individuals to choose a tax-
service package that best suit one’s needs.  Their “new reform tradition” provides 
an existing option whereby locational choice is a demand mechanism to which 
local governments respond appropriately with the supply of services.   
 The public choice literature asserts that citizens who live in fragmented 
government service areas are better informed.  This tenet is underscored with 
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Tullock’s (1971) arguments about the loss of information in large organizations 
and Bish and Ostrom’s (1973) assertion that these citizens who live in 
governmentally fragmented areas have more opportunities to match their unique 
needs and preferences for public services, whereby “…the more uniform the 
output, the less likely that those citizens whose preferences and problems differ 
from the average will be satisfied with the service product.” 
Over the years, the Tiebout model has been examined empirically.  
Dowding and John (1994) extensively surveyed studies from various disciplines 
including economics, political science, and demography to interpret five different 
types of empirical test of the differing implications from Tiebout.  These include 
city-size interpretations, homogeneity interpretations, capitalization studies, 
migration studies, and micro-level tests (Dowding and John, 1994, p. 769) 
 
CITY-SIZE INTERPRETATIONS  
In reviewing Tiebout with respect to city-size interpretations, the literature 
reveals a supply-side and a demand-side argument.  These two models come 
together and represent the Leviathan literature (Dowding and John, 1994).  The 
literature deepens as it tries to empirically demonstrate the relationship between 
expenditure levels and fragmentation.  Several conclusions are exposed.  First, 
fragmentation of multi-purpose governments generally leads to reductions within 
expenditures.  Secondly, local government jurisdictions compete in a spatially 
constrained market.  Thirdly, concentration of market share in large top-tier units 
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is associated with higher spending.  Finally, the findings are consistent with an 
alternative hypothesis.  (Dowding and John, 1994, p. 771).   
 The demand-side literature focuses on whether or not fragmented systems 
are more effective in meeting citizens’ demands.  Key contributors within this 
literature include the research of Elinor Ostrom, Parks, and Oakerson throughout 
the 1970s and 1980s, and Lowery and Lyons (1989, 1992).  Based on the research 
generated, it is difficult make consistent conclusions with respect to citizen 
satisfaction and the impact of city size.   
 
HOMOGENEITY AND SORTING 
Homogeneity and sorting interpretations are treated one of two ways.  The 
first interpretation reveals that the greater the number of jurisdictions the more 
homogeneous.  In the literature, this is referenced as statistical sorting.  The 
second implication is that households will deliberately move to jurisdictions 
which best satisfy their preferences for local goods.  In the literature, this is 
identified as the Tiebout-competition implication because it underscores the 
competitive nature of his model.  However, the empirical problem for the sorting 
literature is that statically generated sorting, Tiebout-competitive sorting, and 
sorting due to non-Tiebout factors are very difficult to separate (Dowding, and 
John, 1994, p.775)  
More contemporary research on sorting has surfaced over the last ten 
years or so.  Epple and Sieg (1999) have developed a structural econometric 
model of households’ choices of communities, based on the logic outlined in their 
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earlier work (Smith, 2007).  The Epple and Sieg framework uses a specific 
algebraic form for preferences, whereby it must satisfy conventional properties, 
such as diminishing marginal rates of substitution, nonsatiation, and 
monotonicity, along with what is described as the single crossing property.  This 
condition assures that the relationship between a change in a local public good 
and the price of constant quality housing will undergo a predictable change with 
increases or decreases in household income (Smith, 2007, p. 159).  People must 
evaluate public good contributions exactly the same way.  This method is referred 
to as vertically differentiated preferences.   
Bayer, McMillan, and Rueben (2005) have also developed a sorting model 
that relaxes some of the assumptions pertaining to public goods; namely the fact 
that people can evaluate differently and use individual data as a means of 
calculating the equilibrium analysis in an urban setting.  This method is referred 
to as horizontal differentiation.   
Two main approaches to homogeneity can be identified.  This includes 
accounting for variables such as education, occupation, age, and income.  
However, the approach that best measures the effects of local government factors 
with the migration process to Tiebout sorting is to run multiple regression analysis 
to sort estimates that measure the relative influence of various factors such as 
taxes and services.   
Studies that have demonstrated sorting have included Miller’s (1981) 
study of Los Angeles counties whereby sorting occurred along income, race, and 
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age; Grubb (1982) study of the Boston area identifying income and age; and Pack 
and Pack (1977) study of Pennsylvania whereby evidence of homogeneity was 
found in age, years of education, occupation, and to a weaker extent income and 
household type.  While these studies are consistent with Tiebout, they truly do not 
corroborate Tiebout (Dowding, and John, 1994).   Stein’s work (1987) attempts to 
test Tiebout by regressing service-bundle differentiation against mean municipal 
heterogeneity whereby results generated found no significant relationship, except 
that the variation in common service activities significantly influences sorting by 
race (Dowding and John, 1994).   
 
CAPITALIZATION 
The capitalization model addresses the relationship Tiebout identifies 
between local services and taxes.  Potential migrants will weigh the benefits of a 
locality’s services against their tax liability and choose areas with the greatest 
surplus of benefits over costs (Oates, 1969; Tullock, 1971).  The extent to which 
property tax and local service differentiation are capitalized into property values 
has been used to test the validity of Tiebout.   
Initially, Oates set out to test the validity of Tiebout by studying 
capitalization.  Most studies model Oates’s (1969) methods, whereby property 
values are regressed against dwelling characteristics, commuting distances, 
household income, community status, annual expenditure per pupil in public 
schools, and the effective property tax rate.  Oates found that property values bear 
a significant negative relationship to the property tax rate and a significant 
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positive association with expenditure per pupil (Dowding and John, 1994).  
Nonetheless, there are several methodological problems with Oates-based 
methodological studies.   Capitalization estimates are likely to be subject to a left-
out variable bias if regression models do not include all house-value determinants 
correlated with taxes (Bloom et al. 1983, as cited in Dowding and John, 1994).  A 
second problem occurs with respect to accurate measurement of local public 
services’ effects on property taxes.  Also, variance within several studies measure 
education expenditure per pupil, total non-school expenditure per capita, crime 
rates, and recreational-quality index and highways-maintenance per square mile.  
A mathematical issue related to the actual regression analysis reveals a third 
problem.  By using average effective tax rates as the independent tax variable, a 
simultaneity bias occurs, resulting in even estimation of the negative effect of 
taxes on property values (Bloom et al. 1983; Yinger et al. 1988, as cited in 
Dowding and John, 1994).  A fourth problem reveals issues around 
misspecification of the tax variable.  The Oates’s regression estimates 
capitalization using the tax rate instead of using the tax burden.  Oates’s 
specification always underestimates capitalization of expensive homes and 
overestimates its effect on cheaper properties (King, 1977 as cited in Dowding 
and John, 1994).  Over the years, capitalization has been studied as its own 
outright phenomenon rather than as a means to confirm Tiebout.   
In 1975, Hamilton extended the Tiebout model to include local zoning.  
By taking into consideration the issue with local zoning, Hamilton shores up a 
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problem with local governments financing their budgets with property taxes and 
thus creating an incentive for free-riding behavior.  Effectively, if one purchases a 
home with a house value substantially lower than those surrounding it, yet is 
allowed to consume the same amount of public goods, in essence partial free-
riding occurs.  By imposing a layer of zoning, a floor on local housing 
consumption is effectively created.  In equilibrium within a Tiebout-Hamilton 
model, communities are homogeneous both for their demand of local public 
goods but also with local housing consumption.  Since households carry the same 
tax liability, the free-rider problem becomes void.   
Today capitalization studies fall into one of two general groups; those 
based on the Tiebout-Oates model, and those based on the Tiebout-Hamilton 
model.  The later model suggests that the efficient distribution of local public 
goods is possible with the introduction of some form of zoning regulation 
(Dowding and John, 1994).  However, Pack and Pack (1978) demonstrate that it’s 
difficult to find real world examples of the Tiebout-Hamilton model given that 
most communities are not that homogeneous.   
 
MIGRATION  
Migration studies used to empirically test Tiebout attempt to measure the 
effect of local fiscal differentials on migration flows and residential location.  
This literature is sizable and the welfare variable is most commonly studied 
(Cebula, 1979).  Simply stated, migrants who are potential welfare recipients will 
tend to be attracted by the economic incentive of higher welfare payments (for an 
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extensive literature review, see Dowding and John, 1994).  Cebula’s contributions 
to this literature are extensive.  Cebula (1978) examines the influence of average 
AFDC payments in real terms and public expenditure in real terms on in-
migration figures, utilizing data from metropolitan areas rather than the state level 
as in past studies (Cebula, 1974a, 1974b; Cebula and Kohn, 1975).  Tullock 
(1971) extends Tiebout’s thesis and emphasizes the evaluation of government 
goods and services, along with the tax burden at potential locations of choice in 
which voters-consumers make exiting decisions.  Support for the ‘Tiebout-
Tullock’ hypothesis is evident, whereby white migrants prefer areas with low 
property taxes while non-white migrants appear insensitive to local differentials 
and areas with high real welfare benefits attract non-white migrants though real 
welfare differentials do not significantly affect white migration (as cited in 
Dowding and John, 1994).   
Traditionally, studies that empirically study the migration aspect of the 
Tiebout-Tullock hypothesis examine both economic and non-economic factors.  
Economic variables often include nominal median family income in the state, the 
overall cost of living in the state for the average four-person family, and the 
percentage growth rate of employment of the civilian labor force in the state,  
while non-economic variables include so called ‘quality of life’ factors (Cebula, 
2005; Cebula and Alexander, 2006; Clark and Hunter, 1992).   
Cebula (2009) updates and extends the Tiebout-Tullock hypothesis and 
migration.  He includes nominal per capita state and personal income tax liability 
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within the state, the nominal outlay in state per pupil (rather than per capita) on 
primary and secondary public education, and per capita level of state plus local 
government property taxes in the state.  Cebula adds an environmental condition 
(quality of life factors) that includes the average annual number of heating degree 
days within the state over the long run, as a measure of cold climate.  This is 
consistent with other migration studies (Clark and Hunter, 1992; Cebula and 
Alexander, 2006) and yields similar results to no surprise that migrants have an 
aversion to cold weather and are more attracted to warmer climates. The results 
within Cebula’s 2009 study supports prior conclusions in Vedder (1995) and 
Holcombe and Lacombe (2004) whereby higher state incomes taxes reduce net in-
migration and thereby reduce economic growth.  Further, Cebula’s study supports 
consumer-voters attraction to lower state income tax burdens and lower property 
tax burdens, whereas they appear to be attracted to higher per pupil public 
primary and secondary outlays (Cebula, 2009, 548).   
 
MICRO-LEVEL DATA 
The use of aggregate data cannot provide the motivational link between 
household movement and tax service packages.  However, the use of micro-level 
data can detail an individual’s behavior and motivations between tax service 
packages and household movement.  Tiebout (1957) prescribed the use of survey 
data as a means to acquire these linkages, and thus the use of micro-level data is 
used as an accurate means to test the Tiebout model.  Studies from sociology, 
psychology and geography suggest that relocation decisions stem from 
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dissatisfaction with current housing provisions, neighborhood characteristics and 
from changes in the family life cycle.  The premise that highly satisfied 
households do not consider moving even when benefits outweigh costs is implicit 
within these studies (Quigley and Weinberg, 1977, as cited in Downing and John, 
1994).   
Several studies match household micro-level data to aggregate data for 
location characteristics and fiscal differences (Cushing, 1993; Fox et al. 1989, 
Islam 1989; Mills et al. 1983; Reschovsky, 1979).  Cushing (1993) measures the 
effect of the social welfare system on the migration patterns on low-income 
workers and considers gender and family structure differences.  The results 
suggest that influence of social welfare programs becomes more significant for in-
migrants.   
Fox et al. (1989) employed a three-stage migration process which included 
the decision to move, the decision to leave the metropolitan area, and the decision 
to enter somewhere else.  They concluded that fiscal factors are more important 
factors in pushing people from an area than in pulling them toward one because 
information on fiscal structure is more readily available in an area where a person 
has been living than for areas under consideration as migration destinations (Fox 
et al. 1989, p. 532).   
Islam (1989) used 1981 micro-level data from the Canadian census to 
analyze the effect of property tax and welfare differentials on migration.  The 
results revealed that individuals prefer to live in low-taxed high welfare spending 
 59 
communities.  Mills et al. (1983) analyzed the influence of a detailed set of fiscal 
factors on the out-migration of Canadian family-allowance recipients between 
1961 and 1978.  The findings revealed that migrants tend to be more responsive to 
fiscal than market incentives.  Reschovsky (1979) examines the effect of three 
fiscal factors on in-migration in Minnesota and concluded that fiscal factors play a 
significant role in residential choice decisions. While all of the aforementioned 
studies yield revealing results, the use of aggregate data to identify individual 
preferences is still problematic.   
Several studies have utilized Hirschman’s (1970) Exit, Voice, and Loyalty 
(EVL) model and its relationship between the option of exiting and the dwindling 
will to engage in collective action (Lowery and Lyons, 1989, Lyons et al. 1992; 
Orbell and Uno, 1972; Sharp, 1984, 1986).  Lowery and Lyons (1989) study the 
impact of jurisdictional boundaries on the behavioral assumptions of Tiebout 
using data from Louisville-Jefferson and Lexington-Fayette counties and 
conclude that tax/service packages of city governments do not have a particularly 
influential effect on locational decisions.  Their data revealed mixed perception on 
the availability of alternatives, in which, Lowery and Lyons concluded that 
perceptions of alternative availability have little relation to actual or objective 
availability (Lowery and Lyons, 1992).  Additionally, their results provided little 
evidence to support several of the assumptions underlying Tiebout (1992).  Sharp 
uses data drawn from a 1978 national HUD survey on the quality of urban life and 
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finds that schools and comparative tax levels were considered important by 51 
percent and 35 percent of respondents respectively.   
Using Hirschman’s EVL model as an empirical test of Tiebout generates 
some flaws, including the fact that it measures intentions of individuals moving, 
rather than those who have actually moved.  Furthermore, measures of 
dissatisfaction are concerned with the push factors influencing people to leave 
communities while the cost-benefit approach implicit in Tiebout suggest that the 
pull factors influencing locational choice are equally important (Downing and 
John, 1994).  Micro-level tests reveal that tax/service packages seem more 
important on the pull than on the push side of moving decisions.   
Micro-level studies have also used individual-level survey data as a means 
for detailing factors affecting moving decisions (Percy, 1993; Percy and Hawkins, 
1992) Percy’s work (1993) analyzes both push and pull factors, whereby home 
and housing values, schools, lower crime, public services and lower taxes were 
pull factor indicators.  Locational proximity to people and places, concerns over 
local schools, taxes and family income all were push factors.  Percy concludes 
that his results provide some support for the behavioral foundations of the Tiebout 
model (Downing and John, 1994).   
Present day research still reveals a failure within empirical evidence that 
determines the micro-foundations of Tiebout’s sorting mechanism.  It is important 
to remember the historical placement of Tiebout’s initial work, written during a 
time when racial and social equality were not on the major social and political 
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agendas.  Arguably, the longevity of the micro-foundation of Tiebout’s literature 
rests on the establishment that sorting occurs having less to do with service tax 
bundles and more to do with racial and economic preferences.  This literature is 
also referenced as the social stratification governmental inequality (SSGI) school 
(Neiman, 1976; Ostrom 1983; Lyons and Lowery, 1989.)  The key assumption is 
that people base their residential location decisions on demographic 
characteristics of people already residing in a community.  As a result, people 
with economic means are attracted to reside in communities with others of the 
income, class, and race (Bickers et al.  2006, p. 59).  This is tantamount to 
understanding why in particular whites live in economically and racially 
homogeneous communities.  Under the SSGI model the decision to move is a 
function of income distribution and racial concentrations in a jurisdiction, 
generating a relationship that is used to explain in-moving.   
In more recent years another body of literature has been developed to 
explain why people do not move.  Under the social capital paradigm (Putnam, 
1993; Brady, Verba, and Schloztman, 1995; and Miller, 1998) people will be 
unlikely or unwilling to move given their social connections to their communities.  
These personal investments into friends, civic groups, churches, and the like work 
to keep them tied to their neighborhoods.  Social capital is immobile and for 
some, the transaction costs for finding friends are significant.  Hence the 
theoretical implications are that high levels of social capital investments may lead 
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to a reduced likelihood to move out of a particular residential community despite 
compelling Tiebout or SSGI considerations.   
Trying to identify the extent to which Tiebout and non-Tiebout factors 
weigh in on the decision-making process of potential movers, Bickers et al. 
(2006) examined survey data of four metropolitan areas to analyze the factors that 
contribute to exiting, using Tiebout, SSGI, and Social Capital models.  Their data 
showed that not only was the SSGI hypothesis not supported, but that the effect of 
income seemed to be the complete opposite.  The likelihood of moving is 
generally higher for lower-income families living both in low-income and high-
income neighborhoods.  Families with higher income are generally less likely to 
move (Bickers et al. 2006, p. 73).  Additionally, the probit analysis and 
breakdowns by income distributions provide support for the Tiebout hypothesis 
with the least likely support for the social capital hypothesis.   
This literature review highlights key research findings over the last fifty 
years that explain and expand the Tiebout model.  Clearly, Tiebout’s seminal 
work has provided a theoretical framework in which multiple models continue to 
be developed that assist our understanding of the relationship between local 
governments and communities.    The depth and breadth of the Tiebout model 
continues to embrace multidisciplinary approaches and begins to integrate new 
public goods such as the environment, and the availability of Internet related 
technologies.   
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The Tiebout model is also being used as a theoretical basis for new 
economic models such as determining the income elasticity of housing demand 
given multiple home ownership (Belsky, Zhu, and McCue, 2006). That is to say, 
how does owning a second home in a compellingly different geographical 
location (sunbelt vs. rustbelt) that caters to a particular type of community 
(retirement community vs. traditional family community) fall into the Tiebout 
model?  
Moving forward, it is also clear that the Tiebout model will need to 
address other and more poignant variables that may include immigration status, 
sexual orientation and religious affiliation.  Finally, the application of Tiebout 
will need to continue branching out to include other country studies to empirically 
find whether or not the model only conforms to the United States local 
government structures.   
The literature review provides the theoretical basis for understanding the 
research presented in the study.    Personal experience, ideological considerations, 
the role of race/ethnicity, the role of gender, the role of age, and neighborhood 
context all provide various lenses to use when reviewing the relationship between 
citizens and local government.  As noted, sometimes there are inconsistencies 
within the literature. This is not surprising given the nature of what is being 
reviewed.  A lengthy review is provided to support the understanding of 
government structure, privatization of services, tax structures and an in-depth 
examination of the public choice literature with respect to locational choice.   
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Chapter 3 outlines the research design and methodologies used in the 
study.   Two different hypotheses are addressed and the appropriate models are 
detailed.   
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Chapter 3 
RESEARCH DESIGN (METHODOLOGY)  
 
VENUE OF THE RESEARCH  
 
 Phoenix’s modern history began in 1868 as the first post office was 
established along with an election precinct.  By 1881, Phoenix was incorporated 
as a city.  In 1913 the residents of Phoenix ratified a new charter establishing a 
council-manager form of government.  This set Phoenix apart, making it one of 
the first to adopt such a progressive form of government.  The growth of Phoenix 
was centered on agriculture up until the end of World War II, when it then 
transitioned into an industrial center.  By 1948, residents of Phoenix voted to 
strengthen the role of the city manager position. This type of reform proved 
valuable as it provided a consistent foundation while the city experienced 
considerable growth and political turnover throughout the 1950s and 1960s.  
Modifications to its charter are reliant on its residents.  The development of 
Phoenix over the last 70 years has been tremendous, growing from its 17.1 square 
miles in 1950, to its present size of over 500 square miles.  Today Phoenix has 
over 1.4 million residents and ranks as the 6
th
 largest population in the United 
States.   
 Officially, in 1979, the City of Phoenix adopted an urban village model as 
a means to address growth and planning.  Instead of focusing development in the 
urban core region, it divided the city into smaller geographic communities to 
achieve a desirable jobs and housing balance (Gober, 2006, p. 155).  Today, 
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Phoenix is divided into 15 urban villages, with each village having its own 
planning committees that is appointed by the City Council 
(http://www.phoenix.gov/PLANNING/vpcommtt.html, n.d.).  Committee 
members help plan and direct growth of the city by assisting the Planning 
Commission and the City Council in reviewing land use plans, and zoning 
proposals within the neighborhoods.  Mostly as a result of the urban village 
model, Phoenix has the least developed urban core of most major metropolitan 
regions.   
 Several variables contribute to this growth and include domestic migration 
from other parts of the U.S., migration from abroad, and natural increase (Gober, 
2006).  Domestic migration accounts for more than half of all growth, with 
California and Illinois as the top one and two contributors respectively (U.S. 
Census, 2000 “County-to-County Migration Flows” as cited in Gober, 2006).  
Between 1990 and 2000 Phoenix’s foreign-born population tripled, whereby 
Mexicans accounted for two-thirds of local immigrants. (Gober, 2006).  
Comparatively, Mexican immigrants have very low naturalization rates.  Only 31 
percent of the Phoenix-area Mexican migrants who arrived in the United States 
prior to 1990 became citizens by 2000 (U.S. Census, 2000, Summary File 3).  
Low level participation in civic responsibilities keeps this group at a distance 
within the local political process.   
 The city’s budget is made up of three distinct pieces:  enterprise funds, 
federal and other restricted funds, and general funds.  More than half of the total 
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budget is comprised of these three areas 
(http://phoenix.gov/NRG/aboutcitygov.pdf, n.d.).  Enterprise funds come from 
earmarked sales taxes, and fees paid by those who use water, wastewater, 
aviation, solid waste, golf, and the Phoenix Convention Center.  Enterprise funds 
can only be used to pay for costs associated with those services and programs 
(http://phoenix.gov/NRG/aboutcitygov.pdf, n.d.).  Federal and restricted funds 
include Community Development Block Grants, HHS grants, and other restricted 
funds such as Highway User Revenue Funds.  Again, these funds can only be 
used to support these specific programs.  The remaining budget, approximately 46 
percent, represents the General Fund whereby revenues predominantly come from 
local sales taxes, state-shared sales, income and vehicle license taxes 
(http://phoenix.gov/NRG/aboutcitygov.pdf, n.d.). Given that nearly half of the 
city’s revenues come from sales taxes, dependency on growth and tourism is vital 
and highly volatile.  The city’s dependence on revenue streams configure what 
types of funding can be applied to specific services. 
 Taken as a whole, the residents of Phoenix have an integral role in how 
the city functions, as many of the city’s services are at the mercy of on its 
residents’ volunteer time to function.  Volunteers are an integral part of the city’s 
operational landscape.  Currently the city has more than 800 citizens serving on 
its boards and commissions (http://phoenix.gov/NRG/citizenvol.pdf, n.d.).  
Volunteer opportunities are provided at the local level in many of the city’s 
departments and throughout many city neighborhoods.  These service areas 
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include police, fire, neighborhood services, human services, parks and recreation, 
libraries, mountain preserves, arts commission, public works, streets, and more.  
The community buy- in through volunteerism curbs city staffing costs, reinforces 
city involvement, facilitates a pathway for residents to directly interact with some 
aspect of the service delivery approach, and in some aspects may influence citizen 
satisfaction with services provided.   
 
SOURCE OF DATA 
 
 Beginning in 1985, the City of Phoenix biannually commissions an overall 
objective to measure citizen attitudes regarding the city services and issues for 
policy development, program improvement, and resource allocation.  Specifically, 
this project was commissioned for the following purposes: 
 To provide a vehicle for public participation. 
 To identify public opinions on relevant issues. 
 To identify public satisfaction with current service levels. 
 To pre-test public response to proposed or revised services. 
 To provide user service data. 
 To provide public awareness data. 
 To identify program or policy alternatives. 
The 2002, and 2004 (9
th
 and 10
th
 installations) surveys were designed by 
Behavior Research Center (BRC) in conjunction with the City of Phoenix.  The 
methodology used by Behavior Research Center for the 2002 and 2004 surveys 
are congruent.  After approval of the preliminary draft, each respective survey 
was pre-tested using a randomly selected cross-section of 20 Phoenix residents.  
Key determinants of the pre-test focused on the value, understandability of the 
questions, adequacy of response categories, and questions for which probes were 
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necessary.  A final form of the survey instrument was approved by the City of 
Phoenix and a Spanish language version of the questionnaire was prepared.   
For both surveys, selection of the respondents was accomplished via a 
computer generated random digit dial telephone sample which selects households 
based on residential telephone prefixes and includes all unlisted and newly listed 
households.  This methodology was selected because it ensured a randomly 
selected sample of households proportionately allocated throughout the sample 
universe.   
Heads of households were used exclusively because these individuals have 
the knowledge and background to respond to the survey questions.  This 
methodology is confirmed within the literature.  In addition, the sample was 
selected so that an equal proportion of male and female heads of households were 
integrated into the sample.   
The information contained in the 2002 report is based on 703 in-depth 
telephone interviews conducted with City of Phoenix heads of households.  The 
information contained in the 2004 report is based on 702 in-depth telephone 
interviews conducted with City of Phoenix heads of households.  Interviewing for 
the 2002 survey took place during late May and early June 2002.  Interviewing for 
the 2004 survey took place in early June of that year.   
The targeted sample size for both surveys was set at 700 respondents.  At 
the 95% confidence level, the sampling error of a 700 respondent sample size is 
3.8%.  Sampling error can be defined as the difference between the results 
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obtained from a sample and those that would be obtained by surveying the entire 
population.  The 95% confidence level is frequently used within research 
generated by social scientists.  Notwithstanding, it is important to note that the 
sampling error increases for those subset populations examined within the overall 
sample.    
Interviews for both surveys took place at the center’s central location.  
This facility uses computer assisted telephone interviewing, whereby each 
interviewer worked under the direct supervision of BRC supervisory personnel.  
All of the interviewers who were employed on this project were professional 
interviewers of the center and were briefed over the City of Phoenix Community 
Attitude Survey.  During the briefing, the interviewers were trained on (1) the 
purpose of the study, (2) sampling procedures, (3) administration of the 
questionnaire, and (4) other project-related factors.  Lastly, each interviewer 
completed a set of practice interviews to ensure that all procedures were 
understood and followed.   
Interviewing was distributed evenly across evening and weekend hours.  
BRC followed this procedure to ensure that all households were equally 
represented, regardless of work schedules.  Further, during the interviewing 
segment of the studies, up to four (4) separate attempts, on different days and 
during different times of the day were made to contact each selected resident.  
Only after four unsuccessful attempts was a selected household substituted in the 
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sample.  Partially completed interviews were not accepted nor counted toward the 
fulfillment of the total sample quotas.   
Of the completed interviews, one hundred percent of them were edited, 
and those found containing errors of administration were pulled, the respondent 
re-called, and the errors corrected.  In addition, fifteen percent of each 
interviewer’s work was randomly selected for validation to ensure its authenticity 
and correctness.  No problems were encountered during this phase of interviewing 
quality control.   
During the data collection segment, completed and validated interviews 
were given to BRC’s in-house data coding department, where editing, coding, and 
validation of interviews took place.  Upon coding completion, a series of validity 
and logic checks were run on the data to ensure the data were ‘clean’ and 
representative of the sample universe.   
Both surveys utilized a “split” sample methodology.  Using this 
methodology, selected survey questions were designated core questions and asked 
of all survey respondents while other survey questions were asked of only one-
half of the survey respondents.  This methodology is commonly used when the 
volume of information desired is particularly extensive and the number of 
interviews to be conducted is of adequate size to justify the split.  In the 2002 
survey, questions 1 to3, 5 to 6, and 17 through 20 were designated core questions.  
In the 2004 survey, questions 1 to 4, 6 to 7, and 19 to 22 were designated core 
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questions and asked of all survey respondents.  Respectively, the remaining 
questions were asked of one-half of the survey respondents.   
Aligning the core questions of both surveys provides commonality and 
year to year consistency that allows for both longitudinal and pooled cross-
sectional analysis.  These are as follows:   
Question 1 (Both 2002 and 2004 surveys)  
 
“To begin, would you say you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree 
with the following statement, “Overall, Phoenix is a good place to live.” 
 
Question 2 (Both 2002 and 2004 surveys)  
“On the whole, would you say that the quality of life in the City of Phoenix is 
excellent, good, fair, poor, or very poor?”  
 
Question 3 (Both 2002 and 2004 surveys) 
 
“Next, what do you feel is the single most important problem the City should be 
working to solve in your neighborhood?  (IF CRIME MENTIONED, PROBE).  
And what is the next most important problem?”  
 
Question 5 (2002 survey) / Question 6 (2004 survey) 
 
“Would you say that you are very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very 
dissatisfied with the overall performance of the City in providing services to 
Phoenix residents?  
 
Question 17 (2002 survey) / Question 19 (2004 survey) 
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“Now before I finish, I need a few pieces of information about yourself for 
classification purposes only, First, which of the following categories comes 
closest to your age?” (Choices are: Under 25, 25 to 34, 35 to 49, 50 to 64, 65 or 
over)  
 
Question 18 (2002 survey) / Question 20 (2004 survey)  
 
“How many years have you lived in the City of Phoenix?” (No choices, is a 
continuous number) 
 
Question 19 (2002 survey) / Question 21 (2004 survey) 
  
“Which of the following categories best describes your ethnic origin?” (Choices 
are White, Black, Hispanic, American Indian, Asian American) 
 
Question 20 (2002 survey) / Question 22 (2004 survey)  
 
“And finally, was your total family income for last year, I mean before taxes and 
including everyone in your household, under or over $50,000?” 
 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
The particular questions used from the 2002 and 2004 City of Phoenix 
Community Attitude Survey examine the relationship between overall satisfaction 
with the city’s ability to provide services to its citizens, and with specific city 
services.  Two hypotheses are generated to determine the relationship between 
citizen satisfaction and the City of Phoenix ability to provide services. 
Hypothesis one examines the relationship between personal factors and 
citizen evaluation of the overall service delivery of the local government.  Ideally, 
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one should expect that if the local government is adequately providing services to 
its residents, then the residents should be satisfied with the overall performance of 
the local government.   
 
H1  = Several factors will affect citizen evaluation of service delivery in 
local government, including race/ethnicity; gender, age, residential 
tenure, and income. Furthermore, personal experience with local 
government will impact citizen evaluation of local service delivery.   
 
H0  = There is no relationship between personal factors, including 
personal experience and citizens’ evaluation of service delivery in local 
government.   
 
Hypothesis two examines the relationship between personal factors and 
citizen satisfaction with the delivery of specific local services.  Of the numerous 
services the city provides, fifteen services have been identified to include within 
the analysis.  These services are frequently examined within the literature and 
include: police, fire, crime prevention, waste disposal and recycling, street repair, 
street cleaning, parks and recreation, providing housing for the poor, youth 
programs, new employment, ambulance services, art and culture programs, job 
training, prevention of gang activity, and library services.   
H2 = There is a relationship between personal factors and citizen 
evaluation of specific local services, say police services.  
 
H0=  There is no relationship between personal factors and citizen 
evaluation of specific local services.  
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MEASUREMENT OF VARIABLES 
 
The dependent variables in both hypotheses support the idea of citizen 
satisfaction but slightly differ given the focus of each question.  Hypothesis one 
focuses on citizen satisfaction with the City of Phoenix’s overall performance in 
providing services, generally.  Hypothesis two focuses on citizen satisfaction with 
respect to the local government’s ability to support specific services – police, fire, 
library, etc.   
In both research hypotheses, the independent variables used to predict 
satisfaction include race/ethnicity, gender, age, personal experience, residential 
tenure within the local government, and income.  Within the urban literature, 
these independent variables are often included and demonstrate various 
relationships with experiences.  The literature often examines education levels, 
and political party affiliations into these types of models, however, limitations 
within the survey do not allow for this to happen in this study.   
 
ANALYTICAL MODELS   
 
Testing Hypothesis #1 
 
The analytical model that supports hypothesis one is derived from 
question 5 of the 2002 survey and question 6 of the 2004 survey.  This question is 
the same for both surveys and reads:   
“Would you say that you are very satisfied, satisfied, 
dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied with the overall performance 
of the City in providing services to Phoenix residents?”   
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Responses were coded as follows: 
 
Very Satisfied   =1 
Satisfied   =2 
Dissatisfied  =3 
Very Dissatisfied =4 
Not Sure   =5 
 
Categories very satisfied and satisfied are collapsed and treated as satisfied 
which takes the value of 1; while categories dissatisfied and very dissatisfied are 
collapsed and treated as dissatisfied, which takes the value of 0.  With a discrete 
dependent variable that takes a value of 1 or 0, an analytical model that takes into 
account the nature of the distribution and makes the correct assumptions about the 
error term is needed.  Therefore, logistic regression is suitable.  There are two 
logistic models for hypothesis #1.  The first supports the first part of the research 
question, as follows:  
 
What factors determine citizens’ evaluations of local government 
performance and service delivery?   
 
y = a+ bΣx + e,     (1A) 
 
Where,  
 
y = the probability that the person responding is satisfied; 
a = the intercept; 
b = the slope of the effect of each independent variable; 
x = vector of independent variables predicting satisfaction, and includes 
race/ethnicity; gender, age, residential tenure, and income; and   
e = error term. 
 
The second logistic model estimates the second part of the question: 
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To what extent does this depend on personal experience with local government?   
 
y = a + bΣx1 + bx2 + e,   (1B) 
Where, 
 
y = the probability that the person responding is satisfied with local government 
performance and service delivery; 
a = the intercept; 
b = the slope of the effect of each independent variable; 
x1 = vector of independent variables predicting satisfaction, and includes 
race/ethnicity gender, age, residential tenure, and income;   
x2 = measure of personal experience with local government; and  
e = error term 
Testing Hypothesis #2: 
 
In order to evaluate citizen satisfaction with individual city services, this 
research relies on question 4 on the 2002 survey and question 5 on the 2004 
survey.  Both questions are the same and ask: 
“As you know, the City of Phoenix provides various services to the 
community ranging from fire protection to street maintenance.  On 
a scale of one to ten where one means you think the city is doing a 
poor job and ten means you think the city is doing an excellence 
job, how would you rate the City of Phoenix on (sic)which of the 
following? Remember, one means poor job and ten means an 
excellent job.”   
 
Since the dependent variable is continuous with values of one through ten, 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is appropriate.  Specific services include: 
1. Police services 
2. Fire services 
3. Crime prevention 
4. Garbage / recycling 
5. Street repair 
6. Streets clean 
7. Parks and recreation 
8. Housing for the poor 
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9. Youth programs 
10. New employment 
11. Ambulance services 
12. Art and culture 
13. Job training 
14. Gang activity 
15. Library services 
 
The analytical model for the second hypothesis regression is as follows: 
y = a+ bΣx + e,     (2) 
 
Where, 
 
y = Rating of the particular service, say police protection; 
a = the intercept; 
b = slope of the effect of the individual independent variable; 
x = vector of independent variables, explaining rating and includes race/ethnicity, 
gender; personal experience, residential tenure, and income; and  
e = error term 
 
Separate regressions will be carried out to represent each of the fifteen 
different specific services examined, thus reducing equation #2 practically we 
have: 
Police services = a + bΣx + e    (2A) 
Fire services = a + bΣx + e    (2B) 
Crime Prevention = a + bΣx + e   (2C) 
Garbage/Recycling = a + bΣx + e   (2D) 
Street Repair = a + bΣx + e    (2E) 
Streets Clean = a + bΣx + e    (2F) 
Parks & Recreation = a + bΣx + e   (2G) 
Housing for Poor = a + bΣx + e   (2H) 
Youth Programs = a + bΣx + e   (2I) 
New Employment = a + bΣx + e   (2J) 
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Ambulance Services = a + bΣx + e   (2K) 
Art & Culture = a + bΣx + e    (2L) 
Job Training = a + bΣx + e    (2M) 
Gang Activity = a + bΣx + e    (2N) 
Library Services = a + bΣx + e   (2O) 
 
Chapter 4 provides detailed information reviewing the findings.  Four 
major finding are presented.    In addition, contextual information is provided to 
help understand specific findings within the analysis.    
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Chapter 4 
FINDINGS 
PROFILE OF THE SAMPLE 
The analysis begins with the descriptive summaries of the final sample.  
As Table 1 shows, there were 1405 heads of household in the sample.  Their mean 
age is approximately 46 years old, suggesting that these are adults of middle age, 
divided almost evenly amongst the sexes.  As indicative of the general population 
of the City of Phoenix, Anglos make up a majority of the sample (64.7%).  The 
mean household income is $47,880.  These are adults who have lived in the City 
of Phoenix fairly long, approximately 22 years.    
Table 1 
Sample Statistics 
   Variable Mean SD 
Gender (Male)  
47.0%         
(n=660) 
 
Age 45.8 13.56 
Race/Ethnicity (Anglo) 64.7%         
(n=909) 
 
Income $47,880.50 $19,626.31  
Residential Tenure 21.8 17.01 
City Performance 89.0 0.39 
Support City 91.0 0.29 
Contact City 
32.0             
(n=223) 0.47 
Contact City -- Treated Professionally 
86.0             
(n=192) 0.35 
Contact City -- Handled Timely 
74.0             
(n=164) 0.44 
N 1405   
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The respondents in the sample rate the City of Phoenix highly as a good 
place to live (mean = 91.0%).  They also rate the overall performance of the city 
in delivering services to its residents very highly (89%).  Interestingly, of the 
1405 respondents, only 223 (32.0%) reported having made contact with the city 
within the previous 12 months; seeking service, information, or to make a 
complaint.  The 223 who reported making contact, reported positively on their 
experience with the city “customer service.”  Of the 223, 192 (86.0%) said they 
were treated professionally, while another 164 (74.0%) reported that their needs 
were handled in a timely fashion. 
 
ANALYSIS 
 
The correlation matrix on the interrelationships among the variables is 
presented in Table 2.   The purpose of a correlation matrix analysis is to determine 
how intercorrelated the variables are in order to deal with multicollinearity.   As 
the data in Table 2 indicate, the interacting correlations are fairly good for 
multivariate analysis.  Given the patterns of these correlations, multicollinearity 
will not be expected. 
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A second level of diagnostic analysis for the regression models involves 
evaluation of the nature of the distribution of the dependent variables.  The first 
dependent variable examined is overall performance in service delivery by the 
city (Table 3.)   The sample gives the city a very high rating.  As much as 88.5% 
report being satisfied with the ability of the city to provide services.  Of course 
due to the literature, one would expect these statistics to differ amongst Anglos 
and non-Anglos as well as between men and women.   
While 89.4% of Anglos report being satisfied, 86.8% of non-Anglos report 
being satisfied, although these differentials are much closer for men and women 
with only 0.02% differential, 88.4% and 88.6% respectively.  The distribution of 
the dependent variables for each of the individual services included in the 
dissertation is presented in Appendix A.  As these data show, there is quite a bit of 
variability.  These distributions provide meaningful deviations for the regression 
analysis.  
 
City Professional Handled Race/ Residential Support 
Gender Performance Contact Treatment Timely Ethnicity Tenure Age City Income 
Gender -----
City Performance 0.00 -----
Contact 0.01  -0.09* -----
Professional Treatment -0.12 0.23**  • -----
Handled Timely -0.21 0.23**  •  0.49** -----
Race/Ethnicity -0.01 0.04  0.14** 0.04 0.05 -----
Residential Tenure -0.10  -0.89** 0.12** -0.06 -0.04 0.17** -----
Age -0.07 -0.03 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.27** 0.47** -----
Support City 0.01 0.34** -0.02 0.14 0.05 -0.02 -0.05 -0.02 -----
Income 0.05 0.02 0.05 -0.03 -0.06 0.21** -0.01  -0.07** -0.03 -----
Note:  Significance levels are two tailed.  
*p<.05;    **p<.01.
Correlation Matrix
Table 2
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Table 4 and Table 5 report the mean citizen rating for all fifteen services 
and explore the potential for gaps that may occur for particular services.  Table 4 
examines mean service ratings by comparing Anglos versus Non-Anglos.  With 
the exception of one service, countering gang activity, there are no gaps that are 
significant.   Table 5 examines mean service ratings between men and women to 
determine if a gender gap is evident. With the exception of police services, no 
others achieve significance.   
 
 
Sample % Satisfied Sample % Satisfied Sample % Satisfied Sample % Satisfied Sample % Satisfied
Performance 1405 88.5 909 89.4 496 86.8 745 88.4 660 88.6
Female
Gender 
Table 3
Citizen Rating of City's Overall Performance 
All 
Race / Ethnicity
Anglo Non-Anglo Male
Race / Ethnicity 
Service Sample Mean Rating Sample Mean Rating Sample Mean Rating Gap 
Police Protection 704 7.12 434 7.02 270 7.29 -0.27
Crime Prevention  701 6.49 475 6.39 226 6.70 -0.31
Countering Gang Activity 704 6.64 434 6.47 270 6.91  -0.44*
Fire Protection 701 8.55 475 8.59 226 8.47 0.12
Ambulance Services 701 8.50 475 8.52 226 8.45 0.07
Garbage & Recycling 704 7.79 434 7.89 270 7.63 0.26
Streets Clean 704 6.98 434 6.84 270 7.19 -0.35
Street Repair 701 6.73 475 6.68 226 6.81 -0.13
Attracting New Employers 701 7.04 475 7.02 226 7.07 -0.05
Job Training 701 7.01 475 7.15 226 6.73 0.42
Services / Housing for Poor 701 6.34 475 6.25 226 6.53 -0.28
Youth Programs 704 7.16 434 7.04 270 7.35 -0.31
Art & Culture 701 7.16 475 7.10 226 7.28 -0.18
Parks & Recreation 704 7.14 434 7.11 270 7.19 -0.08
Library Services 1054 8.01 687 8.03 367 7.98 0.05
*p<.05
Non-AngloAngloAll
Rating 
Table 4 
Citizens' Ratings  of Individual Services by Race / Ethnicity
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TESTING RESEARCH QUESTION #1 AND HYPOTHESIS  
 
 What factors influence citizens’ evaluation of the ability of a local 
government to deliver services?   
 
H₁:  Several factors will affect citizen evaluation of service delivery of local 
government including gender, ethnicity, age, residential tenure, and 
income. 
 
H₀:  There is no relationship between personal factors and evaluation of local 
government ability in service delivery.  
 
The logit regression analysis directly testing these hypotheses is presented 
in Table 6.   The chi square (χ² = 178.24, p<.001) testing the overall fit of the 
model is robust and significant.  Thus the null hypothesis that these variables have 
no effect on the dependent variable can be rejected.  Having rejected the null 
hypothesis, we can now proceed with interpreting the regression results.   
Gender 
Service Sample Mean Rating Sample Mean Rating Sample Mean Rating Gap 
Police Protection 704 7.12 351 6.92 353 7.33  -0.41*
Crime Prevention 701 6.49 309 6.49 392 6.49 0
Countering Gang Activity 704 6.64 351 6.51 353 6.78 -0.27
Fire Protection 701 8.55 309 8.48 392 8.61 -0.13
Ambulance Services 701 8.5 309 8.37 392 8.6 -0.23
Garbage & Recycling 704 7.79 351 7.79 353 7.8 -0.01
Streets Clean 704 6.98 351 6.92 353 7.04 -0.12
Street Repair 701 6.73 309 6.74 392 6.72 0.02
Attracting New Employers 701 7.04 309 6.93 392 7.12 -0.19
Job Training 701 7.01 309 7.09 392 6.95 0.14
Services / Housing for Poor 701 6.34 309 6.47 392 6.23 0.24
Youth Programs 704 7.16 351 7.08 353 7.24 -0.16
Art & Culture 701 7.16 309 7.21 392 7.12 0.09
Parks & Recreation 704 7.14 351 7.03 353 7.25 -0.22
Library Services 1054 8.01 484 7.88 570 8.13 -0.25
*p<.05
All Male Female
Rating
Table 5
Citizens' Ratings of Individual Service by Gender 
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 The results show very clearly that gender, ethnicity, age, and income have 
no marginal significant effects on citizens’ evaluations of the city’s overall ability 
to deliver services.  However, residential tenure does have a negative effect (MLE 
= -0.02,  p<.01), suggesting that residents who have lived longer in the city are 
less likely to rate the city high on service delivery.   That is, men and women, 
Anglos and non-Anglos, older and younger adults, and lower and upper income 
residents do not differ in their ratings of the city’s ability to deliver services.  
Arguably, what may be occurring is that residents who continue to live within the 
city have an association with time in regards to service delivery.  Thus, the longer 
one lives within the city, the more one can remember when cost for services was 
less than present day.     
The most important significant positive effect appears to be coming from 
citizens’ overall feelings about the city.  That is, citizens who are predisposed to 
seeing the local jurisdiction as a good place to live are generally more positive 
about its ability to deliver services to its residents (MLE = 2.45, p<.001).  This is 
a very important finding that speaks to a recurring question within the literature.  
The question has been posed frequently as to whether or not citizens’ evaluations 
of local government emanate from their personal experience dealing with the 
government, or from more general feelings about the local government.  This 
result clearly speaks to the importance of citizens’ general feelings toward the 
local government.   
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The regression reported in Table 6A does not include place dummies (zip 
codes).  These place dummies are reported in Table 6B.  They test the hypothesis 
that location of the place of service within the city will impact citizen’s ratings of 
city services.  This is linked to residential segregation and the unevenness of 
service delivery across the city.   
 
Table 6B  
Logit Regression of Effects on Satisfaction with City's   
 Overall Ability to Deliver Services (Zip Code Results)  
Zip Code Effect t-ratio Significance 
85003 -1.77 1.75† yes 
85004 17.80 0.00 
 85006 0.76 0.64 
 85007 -0.84 0.83 
 85008 0.09 0.13 
 
Variable Effect t -ratio Significance
Gender  (Male = 1) -0.05 0.27
Ethnicity  (Anglo = 1) 0.14 0.61
Age 0.01 0.14
Tenure -0.02 2.67* yes
Income 0.03 0.63
Support City 2.45 10.73** yes
Constant 0.83 1.46
χ² 178.24**
Percent Correctly Classified 89.60
N 1392
Note: Zip code dummies (38) are not reported.
*p< .01;   **p<.001.
Table 6A
Logit Regression of Effects on Satisfaction with 
City's Overall Ability to Deliver Services 
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85009 -0.84 1.28 
 85012 -1.85 1.83† yes 
85013 -0.15 0.16 
 85014 0.17 0.23 
 85015 -0.94 1.45 
 85016 0.65 0.73 
 85017 -1.54 2.61** yes 
85018 -1.37 2.45* yes 
85019 0.20 0.25 
 85020 -0.34 0.52 
 85021 -0.61 0.91 
 85022 0.10 0.13 
 85023 0.56 0.75 
 85024 -0.88 0.90 
 85027 -0.37 0.62 
 85028 0.09 0.10 
 85029 -0.25 0.36 
 85031 -1.68 2.40* yes 
85033 -1.35 2.55** yes 
85034 17.89 0.00 
 85035 -1.58 2.16* yes 
85037 -1.26 1.91† yes 
85040 -0.74 1.17 
 85041 -1.20 1.94† yes 
85042 -0.95 1.38 
 85043 18.02 0.00 
 85044 -0.33 0.42 
 85045 17.81 0.00 
 85048 0.01 0.01 
 85050 -1.01 1.27 
 85051 -0.88 1.38 
 85053 -0.25 0.32 
 85086 -3.41 2.40* yes 
Note: Zip Code 85032 is the omitted reference category 
†p<.05 one tail test;   *p<.05;   
**p<.01.      
 
    Of the 38 zip codes within the model, ten of them reached significance and 
are indicated within the table.  Interestingly, all the zip codes achieving statistical 
significance are negatively signed.  This means residents in these areas are less 
likely to rate the city high on service delivery relative to reference zip code 
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85032.  This type of analysis is important because it provides geographical 
context to service areas that are less likely to rate the city high on its overall 
ability to deliver services.  A better contextual understanding is provided once 
these zip code areas are mapped and provide for visualization.  Figure 1 shows 
this data mapped for easy visualization.       
Figure 1: Visual Analysis of Contextual Results for Service Districts
 
 The top portions of Figure 1 highlight the zip code regions that make up 
Phoenix.  The bottom portions of Figure 1 are those zip codes that reached 
significance within the regression model.  This visualization shows that areas 
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within specific urban villages of the city are impacted.  The very north region 
indicated by zip code 85086 represents a newly annexed land that was acquired in 
1995 and again in 2003.  While pockets of this area remain unincorporated, the 
Phoenix General Plan (2010) includes this area.  Incorporation may influence the 
quality of service.  Contextually this may explain why this area was less likely to 
rate the city high for overall support of services.  Zip codes found within the west 
and south regions of the city represent the Maryvale and South Mountain urban 
villages.  These communities demographically are Black and Latino concentrated 
areas which have been historically underserved.  The effects of residential 
segregation may explain why these areas are less likely to rate the city high 
overall.   
The second part of research question one asks whether personal 
experience with local government will impact citizens’ evaluations of service 
delivery in local government.  The hypothesis derived from this question says that 
personal experience will be a factor.  The null hypothesis states that personal 
experience will not matter.  The analysis in Table 7 answers these hypotheses 
directly.   
The data in Table 7 are arranged under three (3) regression models.  
Regression model 1 tests the effect of contacting the city, while regression models 
2 and 3 test two different renditions of the experience of contacting the city and 
having a positive experience.  Model 2 tests the effect of contacting the city and 
being handled professionally, while Model 3 tests the effect of contacting the city 
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and having needs handled in a timely fashion.  Looking very closely at the chi 
squares (χ² = 103.46, 24.26, 26.49, p<.001) testing the relevance of the three 
models, it is clear that these variables have no clear effects on the dependent 
variable, therefore the null hypothesis can be rejected.  With the robustness of 
these models now confirmed we can move to the marginal effects of the variables.   
Model 1 shows very clearly that the effect of contacting the city is 
negative and significant (MLE = -0.78, p<.01).  That is, those who contacted the 
city for any reason were less likely to rate the city high.  This is obviously 
explained by the fact that those who contact the city make their contact on the 
basis of some inadequacy and may already be exacerbated about what they may 
already be defining as the general failing of the city.   
 The contrasting tale emerges in Models two and three where the results 
clearly show that those who have contacted the city and left with a positive 
experience rate the city much higher than their counterparts who did not leave 
with a satisfactory experience (MLE=1.21, p <.05and 1.20, p<.01, respectively).  
Interestingly while the effect of contacting has been introduced to the models, the 
positive effect of general feelings of the city remains robust and positive across all 
three models.  The story is clear, while citizens’ general feelings about their 
community comes into play in evaluation of their local government’s ability to 
provide services to its residents their personal experience dealing with the local 
government should not be discounted.  In other words, both factors are relevant.   
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Table 7 
Logit Regression of Effect on Satisfaction with City's Overall   
Ability to Deliver Services (Factoring in the Effects of Contact with City)  
    Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  
Contacted City  -0.78**  
(2.69) 
----- ----- 
Contacted City & Handled Professionally ----- 1.21*        
(2.48) 
----- 
Contacted City & Handled Timely ----- -----  1.20**      
(2.77) 
Gender  (Male = 1)   -0.23        
(0.79) 
 -0.12           
(0.29) 
0.02              
(0.04) 
Race/Ethnicity  (Anglo = 1)   -0.05      
(0.15) 
0.33       
(0.72) 
0.34    
(0.74) 
Age 0.05        
(0.03) 
0.10       
(0.43) 
0.08   
(0.36) 
Residential Tenure  -0.01      
(1.56) 
 -0.02     
(1.36) 
 -0.02  
(1.54) 
Income 0.19*      
(2.44) 
0.11       
(0.92) 
0.10   
(0.84) 
Support City 1.87***  
(5.04) 
1.80***   
(3.24) 
2.02***  
(3.61) 
 
   Constant  0.738 -1.15 -1.12 
χ² 106.46*** 24.60*** 26.49*** 
Percent Correctly Classified 89.90 85.90 85.50 
N 694 220 220 
Note:  Figures in parenthesis are t-statistics 
  *p<0.05;   **p<0.01;   ***p<0.001 
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TESTING RESEARCH QUESTION #2 AND HYPOTHESES 
 
What personal factors influence citizens’ evaluation of local government to 
deliver specific local services?   
 
H2: There is a relationship between personal factors and citizen evaluation of 
specific local services, say police services.  
 
H0: There is no relationship between personal factors and citizen evaluation of 
specific local services.  
 
The ordinary least squares regression analyses directly testing these 
hypotheses are presented in Table 8.  Three of the fifteen services analyzed (not 
reported) did not generate any effects.  Their F-ratios did not achieve significance.  
These services included fire, garbage and recycling, and parks and recreation 
services.  Therefore, the null hypotheses are accepted for fire, garbage and 
recycling, and parks and recreation services, indicating that there is no 
relationship between personal factors and citizen evaluation of these services 
respectfully.   
In reviewing the results within the reported models, it is clear that overall 
support for the city impacts the review of specific city services.  Within each 
regression for the specific service reported, support for the city is significant.  
Heads of households, who already have a positive opinion of the city, tend to rate 
delivery of specific services highly.  This supports the broader view of the 
‘bandwagon effect’ whereby people who have a positive view of the city to begin 
with will have a positive review of specific services across the board.  This result 
 93 
is observed in rating the city’s overall ability to deliver services.  Now one also 
sees the effects across specific services.   
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Police Crime Gang Ambulance Street Street New Job Housing Youth Art and Library
Variable Services Prevention Prevention Services Clean Repair Employ Training for Poor Programs Culture Services
Gender              
(Male =1) 
 -0.43**    
(2.49)
 -0.05            
(0.28)
 -0.30        
(1.50)
 -0.24†            
(1.72)
 -0.16           
(0.89)
 -0.02         
(0.12)
 -0.21          
(1.18)
0.08    
(0.36)
0.14         
(0.62)
 -0.15           
(0.75)
0.11     
(0.63)
 -0.23        
(1.62)
Race/Ethnicity 
(Anglo = 1)
 -0.40*      
(2.09)
 -0.28                
(1.32)
-0.46*       
(2.05)
0.09       
(0.60)
 -0.35†          
(1.73)
0.05    
(0.22)
 -0.04          
(0.22)
0.34      
(1.44)
 -0.13       
(0.51)
 -0.49*           
(2.29)
 -0.18         
(0.90)
0.00     
(0.02)
Age 0.04  
(0.50)
0.18*   
(2.01)
0.03   (0.26) 0.09       
(1.27)
0.16†          
(1.77)
0.03   
(0.32)
0.13†     
(1.64)
0.18†          
(1.70)
0.06     
(0.52)
0.44***    
(4.53)
0.24**    
(2.77)
0.09    
(1.26)
Residential Tenure -0.01         
(0.84)
 -0.02**               
(2.81)
-0.01†       
(1.88) 
 -0.00            
(0.73)
-0.03***           
(4.13)
-0.02**         
(2.81)
-0.01           
(1.44)
-0.02*       
(2.05)
-0.03***    
(3.72)     
 -0.03***           
(5.27)
-0.01†           
(1.76)
0.00     
(0.68)
Income 0.08†  
(1.68)
0.04      
(0.76)
0.02    
(0.46)
 -0.09*              
(2.53)
-0.03          
(0.60)
 -0.05        
(1.06)
0.02     
(0.34)
0.13*    
(2.33)
0.01     
(0.21)
 -0.03              
(0.68)
-0.07           
(1.48)
-0.02        
(0.46)
Support City 1.41***  
(4.43)
1.97***  
(6.45)
0.89*  
(2.38)
0.65**    
(2.86)
0.58†    
(1.75)
1.43***   
(4.72)
1.42*** 
(4.84)
1.27***   
(3.65)
0.80*            
(2.22)
0.63†    
(1.77)
1.01***    
(3.51)
0.61**    
(2.58)
Constant 6.00*** 4.60*** 6.37*** 8.09*** 6.85*** 5.90*** 5.56*** 4.91*** 6.05*** 6.39*** 6.02*** 7.27***
F-Ratio 5.36*** 9.30*** 2.92** 3.39** 4.28*** 5.68*** 4.89*** 4.78*** 3.93** 6.87*** 4.17*** 2.29*
R² (x100) 4.50 7.50 2.50 2.90 3.60 4.70 4.10 4.00 3.30 5.70 3.50 1.30
Adj. R² (x100) 3.60 6.70 1.60 2.00 2.80 3.90 3.20 3.20 2.50 4.80 2.70 0.70
N 693 697 693 697 693 697 697 697 697 693 697 1045
Note:  Reference category for gender is male.  Reference category for ethnicity is Anglo.  
Figures in parenthesis are t-statistics. 
†p<.05 one tail test;   *p<.05;   **p<.01;   ***p<.001.  
Table 8 
Determinants of Citizens' Ratings of City Performance in Individual Service Areas
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Four personal factors impact citizen’s ratings of police services.  One is 
gender.  The data reveal that men are less likely than women to rate the city high 
on police services.  Race/Ethnicity is also important.  Compared to non-Anglos, 
Anglos were less likely to rate police services high.  The last two are overall 
support for the city and income.  Age and residential tenure are not significant and 
therefore do not explain for police services ratings.  Wealthier households are 
more likely to rate police services high.  The null hypothesis is rejected.   
Three factors explain citizen’s ratings of the city in crime prevention 
services.  The first is overall support for the city.  The data also reveal the older 
the head of household was, the more likely they rated the city high on crime 
prevention services.  Additionally, the data reveal the longer one has resided in 
the city the less likely they rated the city high in crime prevention services.  
Gender, race/ethnicity, and income are not significant and therefore do not 
explain crime prevention service ratings.   
In reviewing gang prevention services, overall support for the city remains 
a strong personal factor determining satisfaction.  The data also reveal that Anglos 
are less likely to rate gang prevention services high.  In addition, the longer one 
has lived in the city, the less likely they are to rate prevention of gang activity 
high.  Gender, age, and income are not statistically significant and therefore are 
not personal factors related to explaining gang prevention service ratings.   
Moving to ambulance services, overall support for the city remains strong.    
Males are less likely than females to rate ambulance services high,  and those 
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whose incomes are higher are less likely to rate ambulance services high.  Race/ 
ethnicity, age, and residential tenure are not statistically significant and therefore 
are not personal factors that explain citizen evaluation of ambulance services.  
The profile of a resident rating the city high on ambulance services is a lower 
income female who is already sanguine about the city.     
The longer one has lived in the city, the less likely they rated the city high 
on street cleaning performance.  Anglos are less likely than non-Anglos to rate the 
city high on street cleaning performance.  Age is also a contributing personal 
factor, whereby older residents are more likely than younger residents to rate 
street cleaning services high.  Those who show overall support for the city are 
also more likely to rate street cleaning services high.  Gender and income are not 
statistically significant and therefore are not personal factors associated with 
citizen evaluation of street cleaning services.   
Support for the city is a strong personal factor in determining satisfaction 
with street repair services.  Residential tenure is also significant, and produces a 
negative effect.  In other words, the longer one has lived in the city, the less likely 
they are to rate the city high on street repair services.  Gender, race/ethnicity, age, 
and income are not statistically significant and are not personal factors related to 
explaining citizen evaluation of street repair services.   
In reviewing services to attract new employers, overall support for the city 
remains a strong factor.  Age is also a contributing personal factor, whereby the 
older one is, the more likely he or she is to rate the city high in attracting new 
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employers to the city.  Gender, race/ethnicity, residential tenure, and income are 
not statistically significant and are not personal factors that contribute to 
understanding citizens’ service ratings of the city’s efforts in attracting new 
employers.   
Overall support for the city is the strongly related to high service ratings in 
job training services.  Age and income also contribute; whereby the older one is, 
and the more income one has, respectively each are likely to rate the city high in 
providing job training services.  Residential tenure is statistically significant, and 
has a negative effect, whereby the longer one has lived in the city, the less likely 
he or she is to rate the city high in job training services.  Gender and 
race/ethnicity are not statistically significant.  are not personal factors that 
contribute to job training service ratings.   
In reviewing housing services for the poor, length of residence is 
important.  Residents who have lived in the city for much longer rated the city 
lower on housing services for the poor.  Overall support for the city contributes, 
whereby if one supports the city overall, the more likely he or she will rate 
housing services for the poor high.  Gender, race/ethnicity, age, and income are 
not statistically significant and do not contribute to explaining ratings for housing 
service for the poor.   
Age and residential tenure are associated with explaining the likelihood of 
high ratings for youth program services.  The older one is, the more likely he or 
she will rate the city high in youth program services.  However, the effect of 
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residential tenure is negative, and therefore, the longer one has lived in the city, 
the less likely he or she will rate the city high in youth program services.  Anglos 
are less likely than non-Anglos to rate the city high in youth program services.  
Those who have an overall support for the city are more likely to rate youth 
program services high.  Gender and income are not statistically significant and do 
not contribute as personal factors that explain youth program service ratings.   
Regarding art and culture services, overall support for the city is germane 
and has a positive effect.   Age also contributes, whereby the older one is, the 
more likely he or she will rate art and culture services high.  Residential tenure is 
significant and negative, indicating the longer one has lived in the city, the less 
likely he or she will rate the city high in providing art and culture services.  
Gender, race/ethnicity, and income are not statistically significant and thus are not 
personal factors that explain art and culture service ratings.   
Finally, library services; overall support is the only significant factor 
determining citizen’s ratings of library services.  Gender, race/ethnicity, age, 
residential tenure, and income are not statistically significant.    
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Chapter 5 
DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Previous chapters have discussed various aspects of local government, 
including the relationship between local government and citizens’ review of 
service delivery.  This chapter discusses implications for both scholarly 
considerations, and practitioner applications based on the discovery of findings 
within chapter four.  It also provides areas of consideration for local government 
knowledge application.  
There are four major findings within the study.  First, there has been a 
recurring question within the literature:  does citizens’ evaluation of government 
rest within more general feelings and attitudes towards local government, or does 
this germinate from their own personal experience?  This study answers that 
question unambiguously. Second, in recent times, especially following the kinds 
of investments and attention local governments have been paying to “customer 
service,” there has been question as to how important customer service is to the 
relationship between local governments and their citizens. This study addresses 
that question and shows that customer service is important.  Third, there have also 
been questions as to whether citizens who experience government services 
similarly will collectively react similarly to the service experience. This study 
uses its contextual variables to address that question.  Finally, since Charles 
Tiebout presented his theory of competition in local government, there have been 
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questions as to what exactly lengthy long term residence in a community means. 
The study demonstrates that lengthy residency may mean more than people think.   
While the study focused specifically on the community of Phoenix, 
Arizona, the findings can be extrapolated and used to further generalize 
theoretical considerations incorporated into local government practices.  The City 
of Phoenix is not unlike any other city in that it provides services to its 
community and remains accountable to the community.  The demographic 
makeup of the city, the operational structure of the city, are both compatible to 
other jurisdictions.  Like any other city, it is not immune to economic challenges, 
issues with growing diversity, and overall accountability to its citizens.  
According to the 2010 U.S. Census, the City of Phoenix now ranks as the 6
th
 
largest city in the U.S. with a population of approximately 1.4 million people.  
This represents a 9.4% population increase from the 2000 Census.  Median 
household income (2006-2010) for the city is $48,823.  White persons non-
Hispanic represent 46.5% of the overall population, persons of Hispanic or Latino 
origin represent 40.8% of the overall population, and Black persons represent 
6.5% of the overall population of the city.  Of those persons 25 years or older, 
25.5% have a Bachelor’s degree or higher, while 79.8% are high school 
graduates.  Under the city charter, Phoenix’s government structure is described as 
being empowered by the voters.  The operational structure of the city represents 
the council-manager form of government.   
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IMPLICATIONS FOR THE LITERATURE  
 
The first major finding generated from the study speaks to citizens’ 
general feelings of local government.  The results garnered from research question 
one indicate that citizens who are predisposed to supporting the city are more 
likely to rate the city high in service delivery.  This finding supports the general 
view that citizen evaluations of government derive in part from their general 
feelings about government.  Broader ideological considerations may contribute to 
one’s overall general feelings of local government.  Such considerations include 
political ideology, political culture within the region (Elazar, 1984; Lieske, 1994);  
and a sense of trust in government (Gamson, 1968; Christensen and Laegreid, 
2005).    
Much discussion has taken place within the literature over the influence of 
political ideology.  Generally, one’s political ideology shapes one’s views with 
respect to the role of government.  Within the 21
st
 century, political ideology has 
been integrated into the two major political party platforms – modern liberals 
associate themselves with the Democratic Party and modern conservatives 
associate themselves with the Republican Party.  Traditionally, a liberal view 
shows positive support towards the role of government in citizens’ lives.  Aspects 
of government should be infused via the support of women’s rights, 
multiculturalism, reproductive rights, healthcare reform, environmental issues, 
and support of social programs such as welfare, social security and Medicare.   
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Conversely, a more conservative position believes in a reduced role for 
government within citizen’s lives.  Emphasis is based on the role of free market 
capitalism and individual achievement.  This ideology opposes entitlement 
programs such as welfare and Medicare programs, and frowns at progressive 
social issues such as feminism and reproductive rights.  Additionally, faith based 
conservatives have become more predominant within the Republican Party since 
the 1980s.  These conservatives infuse religious ideology into the political 
ideology of the party and influence public policy at federal, state, and local levels.   
In reviewing broader ideological considerations affiliated with local 
government, political culture is often discussed.  Elazar’s (1984) political culture 
sub classifications of individualistic, moralistic, and traditionalistic help explain 
variations in political processes, institutional structures, and political behaviors 
within a region, and arguably, is now one of the most empirically tested with 
respect to political culture (Lieske, 1994).  Despite the empirical applications of 
Elazar’s work, several criticisms remain to his classification schemes. 
Political culture theory was furthered by the work of Joel Lieske (1994).  
Lieske and Kincaid (1991) contend that people who settled in the United States 
came with distinctive ethnoreligious identities, cultural preferences and ways of 
life.  As groups settled in clusters and migrated westward, values, beliefs, 
attitudes, and behaviors were passed down generationally.  Given the 
pervasiveness of local self-government that constituted the American democratic 
experiment, groups could give significant social and political expression to their 
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cultural preferences within geographically defined political jurisdictions, namely, 
towns, townships, cities, and counties (Kincaid, 1982, as cited in Lieske, 1994, p. 
890).    
Lieske contends that regional subcultures are products of historical 
interactions between the cultural preferences of different ethnoreligious settler 
groups and the nationally centripetal and regionally centrifugal demands of their 
environments (p. 891).  This formulation is helpful in understanding why specific 
city services differ within local governments throughout a region.    Local 
preferences may in fact be a bi-product of regional subcultures which help 
explain, at least contextually, why specific city services may remain high on the 
local agenda.   This may also prove helpful in understanding why certain regions 
maybe more accepting of government services and policies.   
Finally, the findings within research question one support continued 
theoretical considerations between the relationship of trust and government.  
Theoretically, we understand that citizen trust enables governments to act without 
having to use acts of coercion (Gamson, 1968) and that high levels of trust within 
government make available additional policies and strategies to political leaders 
(Aberbach and Walker, 1970).  In addition, the literature offers recent empirical 
examples whereby citizen satisfaction and trust are positively correlated.  
Christensen and Laegreid (2005) found legitimacy of political and administrative 
institutions and actors is based largely on trust.  Van Ryzin, Muzzio, and 
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Immerwahr (2004) find strong links between overall satisfaction with public 
services at the local level and confidence in government.   
The second significant finding of the analyses speaks to the importance of 
customer service.  Within the last twenty to thirty years many local governments 
integrated various aspects of ‘New Public Management’ as a means to operate 
government more like a business and use market based services (Osborne and 
Gaebler, 1992; Savas, 1987).  As a result, organizational culture within local 
governments evolved and now residents are viewed as ‘customers.’  
The results from Table 7 indicate that indeed, customer service is an 
integral component of service delivery and ‘customer satisfaction.’ Within model 
one, residents who contacted the city were less likely to rate the city high.  It is 
safe to assume that contacting the city is a form of “demand protest” due to some 
sort of shortfall they had experienced.  The results within Models 2 and 3, where 
contacting the city comes into play reveals that this additional contact with the 
‘customer’ represents an opportunity for the city to ‘right a wrong.’  The outcome 
within the models support this; those who contacted the city and left with a 
positive experience rate the city much higher as opposed to their counterparts who 
left with a negative experience.   
This finding underscores the importance of customer service as an integral 
component to the organizational culture of local governments.  It supports the 
idea of local governments having a critical second chance at addressing their 
customers’ needs and problem solving service failures.  If local governments can 
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provide successful customer service transactions, their opportunity to ‘win back 
their customer’ is rewarded via a renewal of citizen satisfaction.  In doing so, this 
may keep citizens engaged and develop and strengthen civic participation.  This 
aspect adds an important linkage to the theoretical considerations at play and 
certainly provides an avenue to test empirically.   
Van Ryzin (2004, 2006) applied the concept of expectancy 
disconfirmation theory onto citizen satisfaction of local public services.  This 
body of literature resonates primarily within models examining private goods and 
services.  Others including Bouckaert, Van de Walle, and Kampen, 2005; Lyons, 
Lowery, and DeHoog, 1992; and Oliver, 2009) have contributed to the body of 
knowledge between publically provided goods and services to citizen 
(“customer”) satisfaction.  The findings here support continued examination that 
furthers this scholarship.   
The third important finding within the analyses speaks to context and 
shared experience within neighborhoods.  The findings within the regression 
reported in Table 6B addresses this aspect; specifically, the service areas of zip 
codes 85003, 85012, 85017, 85018, 85031, 85033, 85035, 85037, 85041, and 
85086.  Once mapped, it is clear that several of these zip code areas form a 
contiguous region.  Several possible scenarios could be at play.   
An area of concern is that this may represent a service distribution issue.  
The literature representing service distribution within local governments is vast 
(Lineberry, 1977, Rich, 1982, Hero 1986).  The contextual issue here of “who 
 106 
gets what” is important to establishing an equitable distribution of services that 
generates consistent and effective performance outcomes.  Earlier research with 
respect to service distribution underscored racial discrimination as a factor 
(Lineberry and Welch, Jr., 1974).  Physical environment of the contiguous areas, 
crime rate levels, access to libraries and parks, etc. may play a contributing role to 
the neighborhood composition and neighborhood quality within these areas 
(Lineberry, 1977; Durand, 1976; Lovrich & Taylor, 1976; Brown and Coulter, 
1983).  Indeed, given that residential segregation has contributed to shared 
community experiences, this legacy establishes an enduring social construct 
(Lewis & Hamilton, 2011).      
While much of the empirical analyses in local government service 
distribution took place thirty and forty years ago, the evidence presented within 
this study indicate that this type of analysis remains important in today’s 
discussion.   
A corollary to service distribution is service quality.  This aspect is 
addressed within the street level bureaucracy literature (Lipsky, 1980).   Given the 
contiguous areas of the zip codes affected, service quality may be a contributing 
factor within these regions.  In other words, are residents who live within these 
zip code areas receiving “extra attention” from police, or not enough attention 
from other street-level bureaucrats such as trash collectors and street repairs?   
The theoretical considerations of service quality should reinforce the 
customer service model many local governments have adopted throughout the 
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years.  Empirical tests directed at determining the levels of impact street level 
bureaucrats contribute to citizen satisfaction would be important contributions to 
the literature.   
The fourth and final major finding relates to the relationship between 
residential tenure and service delivery.  The results of the study indicate that 
residents who have lived in the city longer, are less likely to rate the city high on 
service delivery across the board.  Recent analyses over current municipal 
responses to ‘The Great Recession’ (Rampell, 2009) highlight several important 
contributing factors that may explain this relationship.   Most state and local 
governments rely on revenue streams associated with the housing market – i.e., 
property taxes.  When state governments cannot collect revenue from this 
traditional stream, it no longer can provide local government support; ergo, the 
trickle down stops.  The impact on local municipalities is two-fold.  Local 
governments cannot run deficit budgets and therefore must either raise other 
revenue streams, traditionally by raising taxes, or cut costs.   
Since employee compensation represents a major portion of the overall 
cost associated with local government, public scrutiny has increased with respect 
to this area.  Employee compensation includes not only salary, but health care 
benefits to current and retired employees, as well as pension benefits.   
Unsustainable pension costs drive government budget liabilities, and play an 
increasingly larger role in deficits ( Levine & Scorsone, 2011).  In fact, according 
to the National Council of State Legislatures, between 2010 and 2011, thirty-nine 
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of the fifty states enacted significant revisions to at least one state retirement plan 
(as cited in Levine & Scorsone, 2011).   Since most municipal employees are 
covered under state pension benefits, the impact affects local governments.      
Local governments experience the same type of growth and recession 
periods as found within economic business cycles.  Residents who have lived 
within a city for a long duration of time also experience these boom and bust 
cycles.  This may explain why residents who hold a longer residential tenure have 
a lower likelihood of rating the city high on service delivery. In essence, these 
residents use time as a contributing factor towards their evaluation of local 
government.   
For example, if given a twenty year span whereby a resident’s tax liability 
to the city increased by 50%, that resident maybe questioning why overall cost to 
deliver the same set of services cost so much more.  In fact, as demonstrated 
above, this is a valid question, given that municipal liabilities are tightly wrapped 
into employee associated costs.  While the resident maybe very satisfied with his 
or her trash collection throughout the years, he or she may overall harbor negative 
feelings against the city because it’s costing them a lot more for that service.    
This is an important theoretical consideration that hasn’t had much 
discussion within the literature.  If satisfaction of local government services is tied 
negatively to time what other casual variables could help reshape negative 
feelings when time is a constant?  Could this be a factor in shaping regional 
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political cultures, and if so, what other factors would help mitigate the effects?  
Longitudinal analysis should help in this type of review.   
 
IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTICE 
 
Public administration is an applied field that should focus on solving the 
key challenges facing the public sector (Waldo, 1968.)  As public administration 
emerged as its own field of study within the early 20
th
 century, there was a strong 
connection between academic and practitioner worlds, particularly led by 
Woodrow Wilson, Luther Gulick, and Leonard White and their respective work 
with organizations such as the Bureau of Municipal Research (Bolton and Stolcis, 
2003.)  However, over the years, that relationship diminished so much so that now 
the scholarship of public administration research rarely goes beyond the 
boundaries of academic journals.    
Bushouse et al., (2011) recently reviewed the gap between practitioner and 
academic research publications within public administration journals.  The top 
public administration journals were nearly void of publications from practitioners.  
While Public Administration Review added a “Theory in Practice” section in 
2006, Bushouse et al. (2011) found it difficult to establish whether or not 
practitioners ever read this research.  Conversely, while practitioner based 
publications such as Governing, The Public Manager, and Public Management 
are aimed at a practitioner readership, these periodicals are seldom connected with 
the public administration academic community (Bushouse et al., 2011).   
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 The implications within the findings of this study could be extremely 
helpful to guide the practice of public administration in addition to support further 
theoretical considerations.  If knowledge application is a function of engaged 
scholarship, then these findings should be integrated into the practitioner side of 
public administration.  As such, this section reviews the implications to public 
administration practitioners.    
 The first major finding indicates that citizens who are predisposed to 
supporting the city are more likely to rate the city high in service delivery.  
Practitioners who review this relationship between political ideology and the role 
of government will be able to better assess whether or not new local government 
programs would be supported within their communities.  For example, if a city 
manager within a very conservative city tried to implement new publicly funded 
after-school programs, given the community’s view towards the role of 
government, the likelihood of success is very small.   
The same holds true with respect to political culture within an area.  
Awareness of unique political cultures within an area may provide a new lens for 
practitioners to utilize in determining the likelihood of success or failure for 
particular services.  For example, if a city has a moralistic political culture, citizen 
support for government supported social programs should exist.  That said, new 
service that would support social programs would also be supported within that 
community.   Fitzpatrick and Hero (1988), found that moralistic states 
demonstrated greater policy innovation along with greater economic equality 
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among its citizens – outcomes which are characteristic within the political goals 
of that culture.     
Practitioner knowledge of Lieske’s (1994) regional subcultures could 
provide context to better understand regional preferences for local government 
services.  This has implications for local government at an organizational level, as 
well as the street-level.     
 Since the literature also establishes a linkage between citizen satisfaction 
and trust in government, it is important that local bureaucrats develop and support 
an environment of trust within the local community.  This linkage can be 
supported within the daily transactions of street-level bureaucrats.  Consider how 
a citizen interacts with employees of a motor vehicle department.  Positive 
experiences embed a sense of trust within the local community, while negative 
experiences may leave doubt in the minds of citizens that city workers are not 
competent to perform efficiently within their jobs.  Over time, these negative 
experiences can develop into a cynicism towards local government, which erodes 
the trust factor.    Local government practitioners need to communicate to its 
employees the importance trust plays into the city’s ability to carry forward 
services to its community.  As the literature demonstrates, trust is a delicate 
variable that plays a vital role in holding local governments accountable.  
Additionally, trust takes time to establish, so repairing and re-establishing citizen 
trust with local government could become a complicated, time intensive endeavor.   
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 The second major finding within the study presents the importance of 
customer service within local governments.  The implications of this finding to 
practitioners are crucial to local government sustainability.  First, city managers 
should promote an organizational culture that trains and supports this aspect of 
government interaction with its citizens. As with any organizational restructure, 
time and training become vital factors. However, customer service could be an 
integrated aspect to performance management outcomes within various 
governmental units which could help support organizational acceptance of 
treating citizens as customers.    
 Given the importance of customer service, this consideration may become 
an additional factor when reviewing services to be outsourced or privatized.  
Customer service accountability could be difficult to attain given the 
disconnection between private contractors and citizens.  Ultimately, private 
companies hired to perform outsourced work ultimately work for the city, and not 
the citizenry.  Placing this ‘middle man’ within the government –citizen 
relationship could have a negative impact in the development and maintenance of 
the customer service relationship.  Within this model, the city becomes the 
customer and not the citizen.   
 The third discovery within the analysis speaks to the importance of 
context and shared experiences within neighborhoods.  To some degree, the 
importance of context and shared experiences speaks directly to the importance of 
street level bureaucrats.  Public administration practitioners should see this as an 
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opportunity to strengthen neighborhood community bonds with city employees.  
In practice the development of trust at the street level can further the overall 
efforts of the city, and promote civic engagement.  It also can provide needed 
support to bear as the foundation for innovative programs.   
 On the flip side, practitioners should monitor service areas that are in need 
of additional attention.  The results in Figure 1 demonstrate the value of 
visualizing geographical reference points.  Practitioners who are able to utilize 
this type of information become powerful actors in resolving service deficiencies.   
 The fourth and final discovery within the results presents a challenge to 
practitioners.  The finding yields a negative relationship between residential 
tenure and citizen satisfaction of city services.  The literature suggests that the 
impact of time could be the key contributor in explaining this phenomenon.  
Boom and bust cycles within an economic timeframe will happen and we accept 
that assumption within a capitalistic economic model.   
 Given the recent literature that reviews local government and the 
challenges of ‘the great recession’ we know that factors such as health care and 
pension cost are contributing to overall citizen liability.  Examples within the 
current literature highlight and propose several means to make changes.  
However, these changes have come from modifications gained through political 
means, and not bureaucratic.   
 Public administration practitioners could begin to instill measures that 
would help alleviate the problems associated with increased health cost of 
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government workers.  Several practical examples exist, including the state of 
Alabama’s ‘fat tax’ and various increases to medical co-pays for smokers.  These 
types of reward and penalty practices to modify government employee behaviors 
are at best, controversial.  Arguably, if government employees are agents of 
public stewardship, then imposing behavior modification tactics promotes public 
stewardship.    Under this model, sanctions to those who choose not to comply are 
justly warranted.  Many barriers lie within implementing such organizational 
changes, and thus the likelihood of transitioning to this type of model is unlikely, 
particularly without mitigating political support.   
 Chapter five has discussed the implications of the research findings 
framing the discussion around theoretical and practical considerations.  This 
conversation is necessary.  The practice cannot move forward without 
understanding and integrating the theory.  New and existing theories cannot be 
developed unless scholars empirically examine what is truly going on at local, and 
other various levels of government.  The marriage between the two needs to stay 
balanced and the discussion presented within chapter five underscores its 
importance.   
 
CONSIDERATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
 
 Like all research, there are limitations within the data set.  Based on the 
discussion within Chapter 5, it would be ideal if specific questions were 
integrated into the survey instrument that could encapsulate political ideology/ 
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affiliation.  The first major finding supports the view that citizen evaluations of 
government are derived in part from their general feelings of government.  
Capturing political ideology or party affiliation may lead to a better understanding 
of where association plays out, and could add to further theoretical considerations.   
As mentioned earlier, the City of Phoenix relies heavily on its volunteers to help 
curtail costs.  Capturing this aspect within the survey instrument would yield a 
very unique opportunity to examine how aspects of volunteerism contribute to 
overall satisfaction of local government and local government services.  It would 
be interesting to explore how this aspect contributes to the customer service 
model.  Theoretically, volunteers are both consumers and customer 
representatives of their local government.  The second major finding points to the 
importance of customer service within organizational cultures of local 
governments.  Given the importance, from a practitioner lens, it would become 
vital to instill the customer service culture into the training and performance of its 
volunteers.   This is an area that garners further empirical exploration.   
Arguably, local government has the most direct impact on citizens.  Experiences 
that take place on the local level contribute to the overall political socialization 
process.  The organic nature of local government permits change to occur more 
frequently and fluidly at this level.  Continued empirical research that examines 
the bond between local government and citizens furthers our understanding of this 
relationship and allows for a more responsive form of government to develop.   
 116 
REFERENCES 
Aberbach, J. D.; Rockman, B. A. (2000).  In the Web of Politics: Three Decades 
of the U.S. Federal Executive.  Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution Press.  
 
Aberback, J.D., & Walker, J.L.  (1970).  The attitudes of Blacks and Whites 
toward city services:  Implications for public policy.  In, Financing the 
Metropolis.  Public policy in urban economies.  Beverly Hills, CA: Sage 
Publications. 
 
Alba, R.D., & Logan, J. (1991). Variations on two themes: racial and ethnic 
patterns in the attainment of suburban residence.  Demography, 28, 431-453. 
 
Alba, R.D., & Logan, J.  (1993).  Minority proximity to Whites in suburbs: An 
individual-level analysis of segregation.  American Journal of Sociology, 98, 
1388-1427.   
 
Alvarez, M.R. & Butterfield, T.L. (2000). The resurgence of nativism in 
California? The case of Proposition 187 and illegal immigration.  Social Science 
Quarterly, 81, 167-179.  
 
Ammons, D.N. (1996).  Municipal benchmarks: Assessing local performance and 
establishing community standards.  Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.   
 
Arizona Department of Health Services.  (2000).  Advanced Arizona vital 
statistics for 2000.  Accessed at 
http://www.azdhs.gov/plan/report/ahs/ahs2000/toc00.htm 
 
Arrow, K. (1950).  A difficulty in the concept of social welfare.  Journal of 
Political Economy, 58(4): 328-346. 
 
Antunes, G.E., & Plumlee, J.P. (1977).  The distribution of an urban public 
service: Ethnicity, socioeconomic status, and bureaucracy as determinants of the 
quality of neighborhood streets.  Urban Affairs Review, 12, 313- 332. 
 
Barlow, D.E., & Barlow, M.H. (2002).  Racial profiling: A survey of African 
American police officers.  Police Quarterly, 5, 334-358.  
 
Barnes, C., & Gill, D.  (2000).  Declining government performance? Why citizens 
don’t trust government.  Wellington, New Zealand: State Services Commission.   
 
Basolo, v., & Strong, D. (2002). Understanding the neighborhood: From 
residents’ perceptions and needs to action.  Housing Policy Debate, 13, 83-105.  
 
 117 
Baxter, S. & Lansing, M. (1983). Women and politics. Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press. 
 
Bayer, P., R. McMillan, and K. Rueben (2005).  A equilibrium model of sorting 
in an urban housing market.  NBER working paper 10865. 
Beck, P.A., Rainey, H.G., and Traut, C.  (1990).  Disadvantage, disaffection, and 
race as divergent bases for citizen fiscal policy preferences.  The Journal of 
Politics 52 (1) 71-93. 
 
Behavior Research Center. (2002/2004).  City of Phoenix Community Attitude 
Survey. Machine-readable data file. Phoenix, AZ: Behavior Research Center. 
 
Belsky, E.S., Zhu, X,D., & McCue, D. (2006).  Multiple-home ownership and the 
income elasticity of housing demand.  Joint Center for Housing Studies of 
Harvard University.  W06-5.  
Accessed at: http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/homeownership/w06-
5.pdf.  
 
Berman, E.M. (1997).  Dealing with cynical citizens.  Public Administration 
Review, 57(2) 105-112.   
 
Bickers, K.N., Salucci, L, & Stein, R.M. (2006).  Assessing the micro-foundations 
of the Tiebout model.  Urban Affairs Review, 42, 57-80.   
 
Bish, R.L. and Ostrom, V. (1973).  Understanding Urban Government.  
Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute.   
 
Black, D. (1948a)  On the rationale of group decision making.  Journal of 
Political Economy, 56 (1) 23-34. 
 
Black, D.  (1948b).  The elasticity of committee decisions with an altering size of 
majority.  Econometria, 16 (3) 262-270. 
 
Blau, P. M. (1977).  Inequality and heterogeneity: A primitive theory of social 
structure.  Free Press.   
 
Blocker, T., & Eckberg, D. (1989). Environmental issues as women’s issues: 
General concerns and local hazards. Social Science Quarterly,70, 586-593. 
 
Bloom, H.S., Ladd, H., and Yinger, J.  (1983).  Are property taxes capitalized into 
property values?  In G.R. Zodrow (Ed.). Local Provision of Public Services:  The 
Tiebout Model after Twenty-Five Years.  New York:  Academic Press.   
 
 118 
Bok, D.  (2001).  The trouble with government.  Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press.   
 
Bolotin, F.N., & Cingranelli, D.L. (1983). Equity and urban policy: The 
underclass hypothesis revisited.  The Journal of Politics, 45, 209-219. 
 
Bolton, M.J., & Stolcis, G.B. (2003).  Ties that do not bind: Musing on the 
specious relevance of academic research.  Public Administration Review, 63, 626-
630. 
 
Booms, B. (1966). City government form and public expenditure level. National 
Tax Journal, 19, 187-199. 
 
Borda, J.C-. de (1781).  “On elections by ballot,” in I McLean; A.B. Urken (eds.) 
Classics of Social Choice.  Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 
 
Bouckaert, G., & Van de Walle, S. (2003).  Comparing measures of citizen trust 
and user satisfaction as indicators of “good governance:” Difficulties in linking 
trust and satisfaction indicators.  International Review of Administrative Sciences, 
69(3), 329-344. 
 
Boyer, E.L.  (1996).  The scholarship of engagement.  Journal of Public Service 
and Outreach, 1, 11-20.   
 
Boyne, G.A. (1998).  Bureaucratic theory meets reality: Public choice and service 
contracting in U.S. local government.  Public Administration Review, 58(6), 474-
484.  
 
Bozeman, B. (2002).  Public value failure: When efficient markets may not do.  
Public Administration Review, 62(2), 145-161.   
 
Bradbury, M.D., & Waechter, D. (2009). Extreme outsourcing in local 
government: At the top and all but the top. Review of Public Personnel 
Administration, 29, 230-248. DOI: 10.1177/0734371X09332572. 
 
Brady, H. E., Verba, S., & Schlozman,  K. L. (1995). Beyond SES: A resource 
model of political participation. American Political Science Review 89 (2), 271–
94. 
 
Brown, K., & Coulter, P.B.  (1983).  Subjective and objective measures of police 
service delivery.  Public Administration Review 43 (1), 50-58. 
 
 119 
Brown, T., & Potoski, M. (2003). Transaction costs and institutional explanations 
for government service production decisions. Journal of Public Administration 
Research and Theory, 13(4), 441-468. 
 
Browning, R.P., Marshall, D., & Trabb, D. (1986). Protest Is Not Enough. 
Berkeley, Cal.: University of California Press. 
 
Brudney, J. F., Ryu, J. E., & Wright, D. S. (2005). Exploring and explaining 
contracting out: Patterns among the American states. Journal of Public 
Administration Research and Theory, 15, 393-419. 
 
Buchanan, J. M. (1949). The pure theory of government finance:  A suggested 
approach.  Journal of Political Economy, 57(6), 496-505.  
  
Buchanan, J.M. and G. Tullock (1962). The Calculus of consent: Logical 
foundations of constitutional democracy.  University of Michigan Press Ann 
Arbor: MI.   
 
Burns, E., & Schumaker, P. (1987). Gender differences in attitudes about the role 
of local government. Social Science Quarterly, 68, 138-147. 
 
Burns, E., & Schumaker, P. (1988). Gender cleavages and the resolution of local 
policy issues. American Journal of Political Science, 32, 1070-1095. 
 
Burrell, B. (1997). The political leadership of women and policymaking. 
(Symposium: Women and public policy). Policy Studies Journal, 25, 565-568. 
 
Bushouse, B.K., Jacobson, W.S., Lambright, K.T., Llorens, J.J., Morse, R.S., & 
Poocharen, O.  (2011).  Crossing the divide: Building bridges between public 
administration practitioners and scholars.  Journal of Public Administration 
Research and Theory, 21, 99-112.   
 
Carr, J., & Karuppusamy, S. (2010). Reassessing the link between city structure 
and fiscal policy: Is the problem poor measures of governmental structure? The 
American Journal of Public Administration, 40(2), 209-228. 
 
Carroll, S.(ed).(2003). Women and American politics: new questions, new 
directions. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Carroll, S., Dodson, D., & Mandel, R. (1991). The impact of women in public 
office: An overview. New Brunswick: Eagleton Institute of Politics. 
 
Cavalcanti, H.B, & Schleef, D. (2001).  The melting pot revisited.” Hispanic 
Journal of Behavioral Sciences 23, 115-35. 
 120 
Cebula, R.J. (1974a).  Interstate migration and the Tiebout hypothesis:  An 
analysis according to race, sex, and age.  Journal of the American Statistical 
Association, 69, 876-879.   
 
Cebula, R.J. (1974b).  Local government policies and migration:  An analysis for 
SMSAs in the United States, 1965-1970. Public Choice, 19, 85-93. 
 
Cebula, R.J. (1978).  An empirical note on the Tiebout-Tullock hypothesis.  
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 92, 705-711.   
 
Cebula, R.J. (1979).  A survey of the literature on the migration impact of state 
and local government policies.  Public Finance, 34, 69-84.   
 
Cebula, R.J., and Kohn, R.M. (1975).  Public policies and migration patterns in 
the United States.  Public Finance, 30, 186-196.   
 
Cebula, R.J. (2005).  Internal migration determinants: Recent evidence.  
International Advances in Economic Research,11(2), 267-274.   
 
Cebula, R.J. (2009).  Migration and the Tiebout-Tullock hypothesis revisited.  
American Journal of Economics and Sociology 68, 2, 542-551.   
 
Cebula, R.J. and G. Alexander (2006).  Determinants of net interstate migration, 
2000-2004.  Journal of Regional Analysis and Policy, 27(2) 116-123.   
 
Chavez, L. (1991). Out of the Barrio. New York: Basic Books. 
 
Chodorow, N. (1974). Family Structure and Family Personality. In Zimbalist, M., 
Rosaldo, M & Lamphere, L (eds.), Women, culture, and society (pp. 43-66). 
Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
 
Christensen, T., & Laegreid, P. (2005).  Trust in government: The relative 
importance of service satisfaction, political factors, and demography.  Public 
Performance & Management Review, 28, 487 - 511. 
 
Clark, D.E., & Hunter, W.J. (1992).  The impact of economic opportunity, 
amenities, and fiscal factors in age-specific migration rates.  Journal of Regional 
Science, 32(3), 349-365.   
 
Clark, W.A.V. (1991).  Residential preferences and neighborhood racial 
segregation: A test of the Schelling segregation model." Demography,28, 1-19. 
 
Clark, W.A.V. (1992). Residential preferences and residential choices in a 
multiethnic context. Demography, 29, 451-466. 
 121 
Clark, W.A.V.  (2009). Changing residential preferences across income, 
education, and age.  Urban Affairs Review, 44, 334-55. 
 
Clark, W.A.V., & Blue, Sarah A.  (2004).  Race, class and segregation patterns in 
U.S. immigrant gateway cities.  Urban Affairs Review 39 (6), 667-688. 
 
Claassen, R.L. (2004).  Political opinion and distinctiveness: The case of Hispanic 
ethnicity.  Political Research Quarterly, 57, 4 609-620. 
 
Condorcet, M. J. [1785] (1972) Essai Sur L’application De L’analyse A La 
Prbabilite Des Decisions Rendues A La Pluratie Des Voix.  New York: Chelsea 
Publishing Company.  Facsimile reprint of original published in Paris by the 
Imprimerie Royale.   
 
Connerly,& Marans, R.W. (1988).  Neighborhood quality: A description and 
analysis of indicators.  In Hutteman, E., and van Vliet, W. (Eds). The U.S. 
handbook on housing and the build environment.  Westwood, CO: Greenwood 
Press.   
 
Craw, M. (2008). Taming the local leviathan: Institutional and economic 
constraints on municipal budgets. Urban Affairs Review, 43, 663-690. 
 
Crecine, John (Ed.). (1970).  Financing the metropolis: Public policy in urban 
economies.  Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications. 
 
Culter, N., & Harootyan, R.  (1975).  Demography of the aged.  In Woodruff, D. 
and Birren, J. (Eds). Aging: scientific perspectives and social issues.  New York: 
Litton.   
 
Cushing, B.J. (1993).  The effect of the social welfare system on metropolitan 
migration in the US by income group, gender, and family structure.  Urban 
Studies, 30, 325-338.  
 
de la Garza, R.O. (2004). Latino Politics.  Annual Review of Political Science 7, 
91-123. 
 
de La Garza, R.O., Polinard,J., Wrinkle, R., & Longoria, Jr., T. (1991). 
Understanding intra-ethnic attitude variations: Mexican origin population views 
of immigration.”  Social Science Quarterly 72, 379-387. 
 
Deno, K., & Mehay, S. (1987). Municipal management structure and fiscal 
performance: Do city managers make a difference? Southern Economic Journal, 
53, 627-642. 
 
 122 
DeSantis, V., & Renner, T. (2002). City government structure: An attempt at 
clarification. State and Local Government Review, 34, 95-104. 
 
Dowding, K., & Biggs, S. (1994).  Tiebout: A survey of the empirical literature.  
Urban Studies 31 (4/5), 767-98. 
 
Downs, A. (1957).  An economic theory of democracy.  New York: Harper.   
 
Duncan, O.D. & Duncan, B.  (1955).  A methodological analysis of segregation 
indices.  American Sociological Review, 20, 210-217. 
 
Durand, Roger.  (1976).  Some dynamics of urban service evaluations among 
Blacks and Whites.  Social Science Quarterly 56 (4), 698-706. 
 
Dutwin, D., Brodie, M., Herrmann, M., & Levin, R.  (2005).  Latinos and political 
party affiliation. Hispanic Journal of Behavioral Sciences 27, 135-60. 
 
Duvall, J. (1999). Contemporary choices for citizens. In R. Kemp (Ed.), Forms of 
local government: A handbook on city, county and regional options (pp. 63-68). 
Jefferson, NC: McFarland. 
 
Dye, T. (1969).  Inequality and civil rights policy in the states.  Journal of Politics 
31, 1080-1097.   
 
Dye, T., & Garcia, J. A. (1978). Structure, function, and policy in American 
cities. Urban Affairs Quarterly, 14, 103-122. 
 
Easton, D. (1965).  A systems analysis of political life. New York: Wiley. 
 
Elazar, D.J. (1984).  American Federalism: A view from the states (3
rd
 ed.). New 
York: Harper and Row.   
 
Epple, D. & Sieg, H.  (1999).  Estimating equilibrium models of local 
jurisdictions.  Journal of Political Economy, 107 (4), 645-681. 
 
Erevelles, S., & Leavitt, C. (1992).  A comparison of current models of consumer 
satisfaction/dissatisfaction.  Journal of Consumer Satisfaction, Dissatisfaction, 
and Complaining Behavior, 5, 104-114.   
 
Farley, Reynolds, & Frey, W.H..  (1994).  Changes in the segregation of Whites 
from Blacks during the 1980s:  Small steps toward a more integrated society.  
American Sociological Review 59 (1), 23-45. 
 
 123 
Farley, Reynolds, Schuman, et al. (1978).  Chocolate city, vanilla suburbs: Will 
the trend toward racially separate communities continue?  Social Science 
Research, 7, 319-344. 
 
Farley,R., Fielding, E.L., & Krysan, M. (1997).  The residential preferences of 
Blacks and Whites: A four-metropolis analysis.  Housing Policy Debate, 8,763-
800. 
 
Fernandez, S., Ryu, J. E., & Brudney, J. L. (2008). Exploring variations in 
contracting for services among American local governments: Do politics still 
matter? The American Review of Public Administration, 38(4), 439-462. 
 
Fitzgerald, M.R. & Durant, R.F. (1980).  Citizen evaluations and urban 
management:  Service delivery in an era of protest.  Public Administration Review 
40 (6), 585-594. 
 
Fitzpatrick, J.L., & Hero, R.E. (1988).  Political culture and political 
characteristics of the American states: A consideration of some old and new 
questions.  The Western Political Quarterly, 41(1), 145-153. 
 
Fraga, L.R., Garcia, J.A., Hero, R.E., et al. (2006).  Su casa es nuestra casa: 
Latino politics research and the development of American political science. The 
American Political Science Review, 100, 515-521 
 
Frederickson, H. G., Johnson, G.A., & Wood, C. (2004).  The adapted city.  
Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe. 
 
Frey, W.H., & Farley, R. (1996).  Latino, Asian, and Black segregation in U.S. 
metropolitan areas:  Are multi-ethnic metros different?  Demography 33 (1), 35-
50.   
 
Fox , W.F., Herzog, H.W. and Schbottman, A.M.  (1989).  Metropolitan fiscal 
structure and migration.  Journal of Regional Science, 29, 523-536.   
 
Fogette, R., King, M. & Dettrey, B. (2008).  Race, Hurricane Katrina, and 
government satisfaction: Examining the role of race in assessing blame.  Publius: 
The Journal of Federalism, 38, 671-691. 
 
Forbes, H.D. (1997). Ethnic conflict.  New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.   
 
Fox, J. (2001). Patterns of discrimination, grievances and political activity among 
Europe’s Roma.” Journal of Ethnopolitical and Minority Issues in Europe. 
Winter/2  
 
 124 
Gamson, W. (1968).  Power and discontent. Homewood, IL: Dorsey.  
 
Gilligan, C. (1982). In a different voice. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
 
Gimenez, M.E. (1998). Latino politics – Class struggles: Reflections on the future 
of Latino politics. New Political Science, 20, 475-485. 
 
Gimpel, J.G. & Kaufman, K. (2001). Impossible dream or distant reality? 
Republican efforts to attract Latino voters.  Center for Immigration Studies.  
 
Githens, M., & Prestage, J. (eds.), (1977). A portrait of marginality. New York: 
McKay. 
 
Glaser, M.A., & Hildreth, W.B. (1999).  Service delivery satisfaction and 
willingness to pay taxes.  Public Productivity and Management Review, 23(1), 48-
67.   
 
Gober, P. (2006).  Metropolitan Phoenix: Place making and community building 
in the Desert. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 
 
Goldscheider, C.  (1966).  Differential residential mobility of the older 
population.  Journal of Gerontology, 21, 103-108.   
 
Gory, M., Ward, R., & Juravich, T. (1980).  The age segregation process: 
Explanation for American cities.  Urban Affairs Quarterly, 16, 59-80.  
 
Greene, J.D. (2002). Cities and privatization: Prospects for privatization in the 
new century. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.   
 
Grubb, W.N. (1982).  The dynamic implications of the Tiebout Model:  The 
changing composition of Boston communities, 1960-1970.  Public Finance 
Quarterly, 10, 17-38.   
 
Gurr, T.R. (1969). Why Men Rebel. Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press. 
 
Hagan, J. & Albonetti, C. (1982).  Race, class, and the perception of criminal 
injustice in America. American Journal of Sociology, 88, 329-355. 
 
Hamilton, B.W. (1975). Zoning and Property Taxation in a System of Local 
Governments.  Urban Studies, 12, 205-11. 
 
Hatry, H. (1980).  Performance measurement principles and techniques: An 
overview for local government.  Public Productivity Review, 4(4), 312-339.   
 
 125 
Hatry, H. (1999).  Performance management.  Washington, DC: Urban Institute. 
 
Hatry, H., Blair, L., Fisk, D., M., Greiner, J.M., Hall, J.R. & Schaenman, P.S. 
(1992).  How effective are your community services? (2
nd
 ed.). Washington, DC:  
Urban Institute, International City/County Management Association.   
 
Hayes, K., & Chang, S. (1990). The relative efficiency of city manager and 
mayor-council forms of government. Southern Economic Journal, 57, 167-177. 
 
Hefetz, A., & Warner, M. (2004). Privatization and its reverse: Explaining the 
dynamics of the government contracting process. Journal of Public 
Administration Research and Theory, 14(2), 171-190.  
 
Hero, R. E. (1986). Explaining citizen-initiated contacting of government 
officials: Socioeconomic status, perceived need, or something else?  Social 
Science Quarterly 67, 626- 35.  
 
Hero, R.E.  (1992).  Latinos and the U.S. political system: Two-tiered pluralism.  
Philadelphia: Temple University Press.   
 
Hero, R.E. (2005).  Crossroads of equality: Race/ethnicity and cities in American 
democracy.  Urban Affairs Review, 40, 695-705. 
 
Hero, R.E., & Durand, R. (1985). Explaining citizen evaluations of urban 
services:  A comparison of some alternative models.  Urban Affairs Quarterly 20, 
344-354. 
 
Hero, R.E., & Tolbert, C.J. (1996). A racial/ethnic diversity interpretation of 
politics and policy in the States of the U.S. American Journal of Political Science, 
40(3), 851-871.   
 
Hirschman, A.O. (1970).  Exit, Voice, and Loyalty.  Cambridge, MA:  Harvard 
University Press.   
 
Hispanic Business. (2006). A year after Katrina, Hispanics more common in the 
Big Easy.  Available at: www.hispanicbusiness.com. 
 
Hoene, C., & Pagano, M. (2009). Research brief on American's cities: City fiscal 
conditions in 2009. Washington, DC: National League of Cities. 
 
Holcombe, R.G. and D.J. Lacombe (2004).  The effect of state income taxation on 
per capita income growth.  Public Finance Review, 32 (3), 292-312.  
 
Huntington, S. P. (2004). Who Are We?  New York: Simon & Schuster. 
 126 
Ihlanfeldt, K.R., & Sjoquist, D.L. (1991). The role of space in determining the 
occupations of Black and White workers.  Regional Science and Urban 
Economics, 21, 295-315.  
 
Inglehart, R., & Norris, P. (2003).  Rising tide: Gender equality and cultural 
change around the world.  Cambridge: Harvard University Press.   
 
Islam, M.N. (1989).  Tiebout hypothesis and migration impact of local fiscal 
policies.  Public Finance, 44, 406-418.   
 
Jakubs, J.F. (1977).  Residential segregation: The Taeuber index reconsidered.  
Journal of Regional Science, 17, 281-303. 
 
Jakubs, J.F. (1981).  A distance-based segregation index.  Journal of Socio-
Economic Planning Sciences, 15, 315-321. 
 
James, O.  (2009).  Evaluating the expectations disconfirmation and expectations 
anchoring approaches to citizen satisfaction with local public services.  Journal of 
Public Administration Research and Theory, 19, 107-23.   
 
Jennings, K., & Farah, B. (1981). Social roles and political resources: An 
overtime study of men and women in party elites. American Journal of Political 
Science, 25, 462-481. 
 
Jeong, M.-G. (2007). Local political structure, administrative capacity and 
revenue policy choice. State and Local Government Review, 39(2), 84-95. 
 
Johnson, P. (1993).  Frames of deceit: A study of the loss and recovery of public 
and private trust.  New York: Cambridge University Press.   
 
Johnston, R. Poulsen, M. & Forrest, J.  (2007).  Ethnic and racial segregation in 
U.S. metropolitan areas, 1980-2000: The dimensions of segregation revisited.  
Urban Affairs Review, 42, 479-504.   
 
Jones- Correa, M.  (2005).  Language provisions under the Voting Rights Act: 
How effective are they?” Social Science Quarterly 86, 549-564.  
 
Jung, C. (2006). Forms of government and spending on common municipal 
functions: A longitudinal approach. International Review of Administrative 
Sciences, 72, 363-376. 
 
Kampen, J., Van de Walle, S., & Bouckaert, G.  (2006).  Assessing the relation 
between satisfaction with public service delivery and trust in government.  Public 
Performance & Management Review, 29(4), 387-404. 
 127 
Kaufmann, K.M. (2002). Culture wars, secular realignment, and the gender gap in 
party identification.  Political Behavior, 24, 283-307.  
 
Kaufmann, K.M., & Petrocik, J.R. (1999).  The changing politics of American 
men: Understanding the sources of the gender gap.  American Journal of Political 
Science, 43, 864-887.  
 
Kelleher, C. & Lowery, D. (2002).  Tiebout sorting and selective satisfaction with 
urban public services: Testing the variance hypothesis.  Urban Affairs Review 37 
(3), 420-431. 
 
Kelly, J. M.  (2003). Citizen satisfaction and administrative performance 
measures:  Is there really a link?  Urban Affairs Review 38 (6), 855-866. 
 
Kelly, J.M.  (2005).  The dilemma of the unsatisfied customer in a market model 
of public administration.  Public Administration Review, 65(1), 76-84.  
 
Kelly, J.M.  & Swindell, D. (2002).  Service quality variation across urban space:  
First steps toward a model of citizen satisfaction.  Journal of Urban Affairs 24 (3), 
271-288. 
 
Kerner Commission (1968).  Report of the National Advisory Commission on 
Civil Disorders.  Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office. 
 
King, A.T. (1977).  Estimating property tax capitalization: A critical comment.  
Journal of Political Economy, 85, 425-431.   
 
King, M. (2003).  Race riots and black economic progress.  The Review of Black 
Political Economy 30, 51-66. 
 
Krueger, A.O. (1974).  The political economy of the rent seeking economy.  The 
American Economic Review, 64(3) 291-303.   
 
Lagory, M., Ward, R., & Juravich, T.  (1980).  The age segregation process: 
Explanation for American cities.  Urban Affairs Review, 16, 59-80.   
 
Lasswell, H. (1948).  The analysis of political behavior, an empirical approach.  
New York: Oxford University Press.   
 
Leal, D., Barreto, M., Lee, B., and de la Garza, R. (2005).  The Latino vote in the 
2004 elections.  PS, January, 41-49.  
 
Levine, C. (1979). More on cutback management: Hard questions for hard times. 
Public Administration Review, 39, 179-182. 
 128 
Levine, H., and Scorsone, E. (2011).  The great recession’s institutional change in 
the public employment relationship: Implications for state and local governments.  
State and Local Government Review 43 (3), 208-214.   
 
Lewis, J.H., & Hamilton, D.K. (2011). Race and regionalism: The structure of 
local government and racial disparity. Urban Affairs Review, 47(3), 349-384.   
 
Lieberson, S. (1980).  A piece of the pie:  Blacks and White immigrants 1880.  
Berkeley and Los Angeles:  University of California Press.   
 
Lieske, J.  (1993).  Regional subcultures of the United States.  The Journal of 
Politics 55, 888-891.   
 
Lieske, J. & Kincaid, J.  (1991).  Political subcultures of the American states: 
State-of-the-art and Agenda for Research.  Paper presented at the annual meeting 
of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC.   
 
Lineberry, R. (1977).  Equality and urban policy:  The distribution of municipal 
public services.  Beverley Hills, CA: Sage. 
 
Lineberry, R., & Fowler, E. (1967). Reformism and public policies in American 
cities. American Political Science Review, 61, 701-716. 
 
Lineberry, R., & Welch, R.  (1974).  Who gets what: Measuring the distribution 
of urban public services: A preliminary model.  Administration and Society, 119-
142.   
 
Lipsky, M. (1980).  Street-level bureaucracy.  New York: Russell Sage 
Foundation.  
 
Logan, J.R., & Alba, R.D. (1993). Locational returns to human capital: Minority 
access to suburban community resources.  Demography, 30, 243-267. 
 
Lovrich, N.P., & Taylor, G.T. (1976).  Neighborhood evaluation of neighborhood 
services: A citizen survey approach.  Urban Affairs Review, 12, 176-222. 
 
Luckingham, B. (1989). Phoenix: the History of a Southwestern Metropolis. 
Tucson: University of Arizona Press. 
 
Lyons, W. (1978). Reform and response in American cities: Structure and policy 
reconsidered. Social Sciences Quarterly 59, 118-132. 
 
 129 
Lyons, W. and Lowery, D.  (1989).  Governmental fragmentation versus 
consolidation: Five public choice myths about how to create informed, involved, 
and happy citizens.  Public Administration Review, 49, 533-543.   
 
Lyons, W.E.. Lowery, D., & DeHoog, R.H.  (1992).  The Politics of 
Dissatisfaction:  Citizens, Services, and Urban Institutions.  Armonk, NY:  M.E. 
Sharpe.   
 
Lu, M. (1999). Determinants of residential satisfaction: Ordered logit vs. 
regression models. Growth and Change, 30, 264-287.   
 
Malone, N.K., Baluja,K.F., Costanzo, J.F., & Davis, C.J. (2003). The foreign-born 
population: 2000. Census 2000 brief. Washington, DC: U.S. Bureau of the 
Census.   
 
Manza, J. (2000).  Race and the underdevelopment of the American welfare state.  
Theory and Society, 29, 819-832.   
 
March, J.G., & Olsen, J.P. (1989). Rediscovering institutions: The organizational 
basis of politics.  New York: Free Press.   
 
Marlowe, J. (1985).  Private versus public provision of refuse removal service:  
Measures of citizen satisfaction.  Urban Affairs Quarterly 20 (3), 355-363. 
 
Martin, R. (1997). Job decentralization with suburban housing discrimination: An 
urban equilibrium model of spatial mismatch.  Journal of Housing Economic, 6, 
297-317.  
 
Massey, D.S., & Denton, N.A. (1985). Spatial assimilation as a socioeconomic 
outcome. American Sociological Review, 50, 94-106. 
 
Massey, D.S., & Denton, N.A. (1987).  Trends in the residential segregation of 
Blacks, Hispanics, and Asians: 1970-1980.  American Sociological Review, 52, 
802-825. 
 
Massey, D.S. & Denton, N.A. (1988).  The dimensions of residential segregation.  
Social Forces,67, 281-315. 
 
Massey, D.S. & Denton, N.A. (1993). American apartheid: Segregation and the 
making of the underclass. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.  
 
Massey, D.S. & Mullan, B.P. (1984).  Processes of Hispanic and Black spatial 
assimilation.  American Journal of Sociology, 89, 316-326.    
 
 130 
Massey, D.S., White, M.J., & Phua, V.C. (1996).  The dimensions of segregation 
revisited.  Sociological Methods & Research, 25, 172-206. 
 
McGuire, M. (2004). Relating to other organizations. In C. Newell (Ed.), The 
effective local government manager (3
rd
 ed., pp. 181-208). Washington, DC: 
International City/County Management Association.   
 
McVeigh, R., & Smith, C. (1999). Who Protests in America? Sociological Forum 
14, 685-702. 
 
Meier, K., & Stewart, Jr., J. (1991).  The politics of Hispanic education.  Albany: 
State University of New York Press.   
 
Melkers,J, Willoughby, K.G., James, B. & Fountain, J. (2002) Performance 
measures at the state and local levels: A summary of survey results. Norwalk, CT: 
Governmental Standards Accounting Board. 
 
Miller, G. (1981).  Cities by Contract.  Cambridge, MA:  MIT Press.   
 
Miller, T.I., & Kobayashi, M.M.(2000).  Citizen surveys: How to do them, how to 
use them, what they mean. Washington, DC: International City/County 
Management Association.   
 
Miller, T. I., & Miller, M.A. (1991).  Standards of excellence:  U.S. residents’ 
evaluations of local government services.  Public Administration Review 51 (6), 
503-514. 
 
Mills, K.E., Percy, M.B. and Wilson, L.S. (1983).  The influence of fiscal 
incentives on interregional migration: Canada, 1961-1978.  Canadian Journal of 
Regional Science, 6, 207-229. 
 
Montjoy, R.S. & Watson, D.J. (1995).  A case for reinterpreted dichotomy of 
politics and administration as a professional standard in council-manager 
government.  Public Administration Review, 55 (3), 231-239.   
 
Moore, Adrian, Nolan, James, & Segal, Geoffrey F.  (2005).  Putting out the 
trash: Measuring municipal service efficiency in U.S. cities.  Urban Affairs 
Review 41 (2), 237-259. 
 
Moran, R.F. (1997). What if Latinos really mattered in the public policy debate? 
California Law Review, 85, 1315-1345.  
 
 131 
National Performance Review (1993).  From Red Tape to Results: Creating a 
Government that Works Better and Costs Less. Washington, DC: Government 
Printing Office.  
 
Neiman, M. (1976). Communication: Social stratification and government 
inequality. American Political Science Review, 70(1), 149–180. 
 
Niskanen, W. (1971).  Bureaucracy and representative government.  Chicago:  
Aldine-Atherton.  
 
Norrander, B., & Wilcox, C. (2008).  The gender gap in ideology.  Political 
Behavior, 30, 503-523.   
 
Norris, P. (2003). The gender gap: Old challenges, new approaches. In Carroll, S 
(ed), Women and American politics: New questions, new directions (pp. 146-170). 
New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Oates, W.E.  (1969).  The effect of property taxes and local public spending on 
property values: An empirical study of tax capitalization and the Tiebout 
hypothesis.  Journal of Political Economy, 77, 957-971. 
 
Oliver, R. (1997).  Satisfaction: A behavioral perspective on the consumer.  New 
York: McGraw-Hill.  
 
Olson, M. (1965).  The logic of collective action: Public goods and the theory of   
groups.  Cambridge, MA:  Harvard University Press. 
 
Orbell, J. and Uno, T.  (1972).  The theory of neighborhood problem solving: 
Political action vs. residential mobility.  American Political Science Review,66, 
471-489. 
 
Osborne, D., & Gaebler, T. (1992).  Reinventing government: How the 
entrepreneurial spirit is transforming the public sector.  Reading, MA: Addison-
Wesley.   
 
Ostrom, E. (1983). The social-stratification-government inequality thesis 
explored. Urban Affairs Quarterly, 19(1), 91–112. 
 
Ostrom, V., Tiebout, C.M., & Warren R. (1961).  The organization of government 
in metropolitan areas:  A theoretical inquiry.   American Science Review, 55, 831-
842.   
 
Pack, J.R. and Pack H. (1977).  Metropolitan fragmentation and suburban 
homogeneity.  Urban Studies 14, 191-201. 
 132 
Parks, R.B. (1984). Linking objective and subjective measures of performance.  
Public Administration Review, 44,  
 
Percy, S.L. & Hawkins, B.W.  (1992).  Further tests of individual –level 
propositions from the Tiebout model.  Journal of Politics, 54, 1149-1157.   
 
Percy, S.L. (1993).  Revisiting Tiebout:  Moving rationales, exiting behavior, and 
governmental responses to metropolitan mobility.  Paper presented at the 1993 
Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, 15-17, 
April.    
 
Peterson, S., & Runyan, A. (1999). Global gender issues. Boulder: Westview 
Press. 
 
Pickus, J. & Gober, P. (1988).  Urban villages and activity patterns in Phoenix. 
Urban Geography 9, 85-97. 
 
Poister, T.H., & Henry, G.T. (1994). Citizen ratings of public and private service 
quality: A comparative perspective.  Public Administration Review, 54(2), 155-
160. 
 
Poister, T.H., & Streib, G. (1999). Strategic management in the public sector: 
Concepts models and processes.  Public Productivity & Management Review, 
22(3), 308-325. 
 
Pomper, G. (1975). Voters’ choice: Varieties of American electoral behavior. 
New York: Dodd, Mead. 
 
Posner, R.A. (1975).  The social cost of monopoly and regulation.  Journal of 
Political Economy, 83, 807-827.   
 
Putnam, R. (1993).  Making democracy work: Civic traditions in modern Italy. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.  
 
Quigley, J.M., & Weinberg, D.H. (1977).  Intra-urban residential mobility: A 
review and synthesis.  International Regional Science Review, 2, 41-66.   
 
Rampell, C.  (2009).  “Great recession:” A brief etymology.  The New York 
Times, March 11.   
 
Reiss, Jr., A. J. (1970).  Servers and Served in Service.  In Financing the 
Metropolis: Public policy in urban economies.  Beverly Hills, CA: Sage 
Publications. 
 
 133 
Reschovsky, A. (1979).  Residential choice and the local public sector: An 
alternative test of the Tiebout hypothesis.  Journal of Urban Economics, 16, 501-
520. 
 
Rich, R.C. (Ed.) (1982).  The politics of urban public services.  Lexington, MA: 
Lexington.   
 
Roch, C., & Poister, T.H. (2006).  Citizens, accountability, and service 
satisfaction: The influence of expectations.  Urban Affairs Review, 41 (3), 292-
308.   
 
Rondinelli, D. A. (2003). Partnering for development: Government-private sector 
cooperation in service provision. In D. A. Rondinelli & G. S. Cheema (Eds.), 
Reinventing government for the twenty-first century: State capacity in a 
globalizing society (pp. 219-239). Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian. 
 
Rosentraub, M.S., & Thompson, L. (1981). The use of surveys of satisfaction for 
evaluations. Policy Studies Journal, 9(7), 990-999. 
 
Rossi, P.H., R.A. Berk, & Eidson, B.E.  (1974).  The roots of urban discontent: 
Public policy, municipal institutions, and the ghetto.  New York: John Wiley.   
 
Rossi, P.H. (1972).  Community social indicators.  In A. Campbell & P.E. 
Converse (Eds.), The human meaning of social change (pp. 87-126). New York: 
Russell Sage Foundation.  
 
Rubin, I. (1998). Class, tax, and power: Municipal budgeting in the United States. 
Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers. 
 
Rumbaut, R.G. (2006).  On the past and future of American immigration and 
ethnic history: A sociologist’s reflections on a silver jubilee.  Journal of American 
Ethnic History, 25, 160-167.   
 
Samuelson, P. (1954).  The pure theory of public expenditure.  Review of 
Economics and Statistics, 36, 387-389. 
 
Samuelson, P. (1955).  Diagrammatic exposition of a theory of public 
expenditure.  Review of Economics and Statistics, 38, 350-356. 
 
Samuelson, P. (1958).  Aspects of public expenditure theories.  Review of 
Economics and Statistics, 40, 332-338.   
 
 134 
Santiago, A.M., & Wilder, M.G. (1991).  Residential segregation and links to 
minority poverty: The case of Latinos in the United States.”  Social Problems 38, 
492-515. 
 
Sapiro, V. (1983). The political integration of women: Roles, socialization, and 
politics. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. 
 
Savas, E. S. (1987).  Privatization: The key to better government. Chatham, NJ: 
Chatham House Publishers. 
 
Savas, E. S. (2000). Privatization and public-private partnerships. Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press. 
 
Savas, E.S.  (2005). Privatization in the city: Successes, failure, lessons. 
Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. 
 
Schlesinger, M., & Heldman,C. (2001). Gender gap or gender gaps? New 
perspectives on support for government action and policies. Journal of Politics, 
63, 59-92. 
 
Schneider, M. & Phelan, T.  (1993).  Black suburbanization in the 1980s.  
Demography, 30, 269-279.   
 
Schuman, H., & Gruenberg, B.  (1972).  Dissatisfaction with city services: Is race 
an important factor?  In H. Hahn (Ed.), People and politics in urban society (pp. 
369-392).  Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. 
 
Scorsone, E., & Plerhoples, C. (2010). Fiscal stress and cutback management 
amongst state and local governments: What have we learned and what remains to 
be learned? State and Local Government Review, 42(2), 176-187. 
 
Shadbegian, R. (2003). Did the property tax revolt affect local public education? 
Evidence from panel data. Public Finance Review, 31(1), 91-121. 
 
Shapiro, R., & Mahajan, H. (1986). Gender differences in policy preferences: A 
summary of trends from the 1960s to the 1980s. Public Opinion Quarterly, 50, 
42-61. 
 
Sharp, E.B. (1984).  Exit, voice and loyalty in the context of local government 
problems.  Western Political Quarterly, 37, 67-83.   
 
Sharp, E.B. (1986).  Citizen Demand-making in the Urban Context.  Birmingham, 
AL:  University of Alabama.   
 
 135 
Siegelman, L., & Welch, S. (1993). The contact hypothesis revisited: Black-White 
interaction and positive racial attitudes. Social Forces, 71, 781-795.  
 
Smith, V.K. (2007).  Reflections on the literature.  Review of Environmental 
Economics and Policy, 1 (1) 152-165. 
 
Stein, R.M. (1987).  Tiebout’s sorting hypothesis.  Urban Affairs Quarterly 23, 
140-166. 
 
Stein, R.M., Post, S.S., & Riden, A.L. ( 2000). Reconciling context and contact 
effects on racial attitudes. Political Research Quarterly, 53, 285-303. 
 
Stipak, Brian. (1977).  Attitudes and belief systems concerning urban services.  
The Public Opinion Quarterly 41 (1), 41-55. 
 
Stone, R. & McQuillan, J. (2007).  Beyond Hispanic and Latino.  Social Science 
Research 36, 175-200. 
 
Svara, J. H. (1985).  Dichotomy and duality: Reconceptualizing the relationship 
between policy and administration in council-manager cities. Public 
Administration Review, 45, 221–32. 
 
Svara, J.H.  (2005). Exploring structures and institutions in city government.  
Public Administration Review,65, 500-506. 
 
Svara, J.H.  (2006). The search for meaning in political-administrative relations in 
local government. International Journal of Public Administration, 29, 1065–1090. 
 
Taeuber, K.E. & Taeuber, A.F. (1965).  Negroes in cities: Residential segregation 
and neighborhood change.  Aldine.   
 
The Rose Institute of State and Local Government. (1983).  A Districting Plan for 
the City of Phoenix. CA.: The Rose Institute of State and Local Government. 
 
Tiebout, C.M.  (1956).  A pure theory of local expenditures.  The Journal of 
Political Economy 64 (5), 416-424.   
 
Tiebout, C.M.  (1957).  Location theory, empirical evidence, and economic 
evolution.  Regional Science Association, Papers & Proceedings, III, 74-86.   
 
Timberlake, J.M., Howell, A.J., & Staight, A.J. (2011).  Trends in the 
suburbanization of racial/ethnic groups in U.S. metropolitan areas, 1970-2000.  
Urban Affairs Review, 47, 218-255. 
 
 136 
Tullock, G. (1971).  Public expenditures as public goods.  Journal of Political 
Economy, 79(5), 913-919.   
 
U.S. Bureau of the Census. (2000). Census of population, Summary file 3.  
Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.  
 
U.S. Bureau of the Census (2005).  American Community Survey. Washington, 
D.C.: U.S. Department of Commerce. 
 
U.S. Bureau of the Census.  (2010).  State and Country Quick Facts.  Washington, 
DC.: Government Printing Office.   
 
U.S. Government Accountability Office. (1989).  The report on the national 
commission of public service.  Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.   
 
Van de Walle, S., Kampen, J., & Bouckaert, G. (2005).  Deep impact for high-
impact agencies? Assessing the role of bureaucratic encounters in evaluations of 
government.  Public Performance & Management Review, 28(4), 532-549. 
 
Van de Walle, S., & Bouckaert, G.  (2003).  Public service performance and trust 
in government:  The problem of causality.  International Journal of Public 
Administration 26 (8&9), 891-913. 
 
Van Ryzin, G. (2004).  Expectations, performance and citizen satisfaction with 
urban services.  Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 23 (3), 433-448. 
 
Van Ryzin, G., Gulick, L. & Martinez, E. (2004). Drivers and consequences of 
citizen satisfaction:  An application of the American consumer satisfaction index 
model to New York City.  Public Administration Review 64 (3), 331-341. 
 
Van Ryzin, G., Muzzio, D., & Immerwahr, S. (2004).  Explaining the race gap in 
satisfaction with urban services.  Urban Affairs Review 39 (5), 613-632. 
 
Vedder, R.K. (1995).  State and local taxation and economic growth:  Lessons for 
federal tax reform.  Joint Economic Committee of Congress Staff Report, 
December.   
 
Verba, S., Schlozman, K., & Brady, H. (1995). Voice and equality: Civic 
voluntarism in American politics. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
 
Waldo, D.  (1968).  Scope of the theory of public administration.  In Theory and 
practice of public administration: Scope, objectives, and methods, ed. J.C. 
Charlesworth, 1-26.  Philadelphia, PA: American Academy of Political and Social 
Science.   
 137 
Warner, M., & Hefetz, A. (2008).  Managing markets for public service: The role 
of mixed public-private delivery of city services.  Public Administration Review, 
68(1), 155-166. 
 
Warren, M.E. (1999). (Ed).  Democracy and trust. New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Weitzer, R. & Tuch, S. (2006). Race and policing in America: Conflict and 
reform.  New York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Welch, S. (1977). Women as political animals? A test of some explanations of 
male-female political participation differences. American Journal of Political 
Science, 21, 711-730. 
 
Welch, S. (1985). The more for less paradox: Public attitudes on taxing and 
spending. Public Opinion Quarterly, 49, 310-316.  
 
West, C. (1993).  Race matters.  Boston: Beacon Press.   
 
Williams, O.P. (1971). Metropolitan Political Analysis: A Social Access 
Approach. New York: Free Press. 
 
Wilson, L.A. (1983).  Preference revelation and public policy: Making sense of 
citizen survey data.  Public Administration Review, 43(4), 335-3342.   
 
Wilson, W.J. (1987). The truly disadvantaged: The inner city, the underclass and 
public policy.  Chicago: University of Chicago Press.  
 
Woldoff, R.A. (2002). The effects of local stressors on neighborhood attachment. 
Social Forces, 81, 87-116.  
 
Yi, Y. (1990). A critical review of customer satisfaction. In V.A. Zeithaml (Ed.), 
Review of marketing (pp. 68-123). Chicago: American Marketing Association.   
 
Yinger, J., Bloom, H.S., Borsch-Supan, A. & Ladd, H.F.  (1988).  Property taxes 
and house values: The theory and estimation of intra-jurisdictional property tax 
capitalization.  London:  Academic Press.   
 
Zelinsky, W. (1966).  Toward a geography of the aged.  Geographical Review, 
56, 445-447.   
 
Zhang, Y., & Feiock, R. (2009).  City managers’ policy leadership in council-
manager cities.  Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 20, 461-
476.   doi:10.1093/jopart/mup015 
 138 
APPENDIX A 
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF INDIVIDUAL SERVICES   
 
Frequency Distribution for Police Services Ratings  
Rating Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
1 17 1.2 2.4 2.4 
2 18 1.3 2.6 5.0 
3 28 2.0 4.0 8.9 
4 27 1.9 3.8 12.8 
5 89 6.3 12.6 25.4 
6 55 3.9 7.8 33.2 
7 102 7.3 14.5 47.7 
8 153 10.9 21.7 69.5 
9 93 6.6 13.2 82.7 
10 122 8.7 17.3 100.0 
     Total (n) 704 50.1 100.0 
 System Missing 701 49.9 
  Total (N) 1405 100.0     
     
     Frequency Distribution for Garbage & Recycling Ratings 
Rating Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
1 19 1.4 2.7 2.7 
2 11 0.8 1.6 4.3 
3 16 1.1 2.3 6.5 
4 18 1.3 2.6 9.1 
5 55 3.9 7.8 16.9 
6 38 2.7 5.4 22.3 
7 70 5.0 9.9 32.2 
8 162 11.5 23.0 55.3 
9 115 8.2 16.3 71.6 
10 200 14.2 28.4 100.0 
     Total (n) 704 50.1 100.0 
 System Missing 701 49.9 
  Total (N) 1405       
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     Frequency Distribution for Street Cleaning Ratings  
Rating Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
1 20 1.4 2.8 2.8 
2 22 1.6 3.1 6.0 
3 30 2.1 4.3 10.2 
4 34 2.4 4.8 15.1 
5 83 5.9 11.8 26.8 
6 66 4.7 9.4 36.2 
7 115 8.2 16.3 52.6 
8 130 9.3 18.5 71.0 
9 71 5.1 10.1 81.1 
10 133 9.5 18.9 100.0 
     Total (n) 704 50.1 100.0 
 System Missing 701 49.9 
  Total (N) 1405 100.0     
     
     
     Frequency Distribution for Parks & Recreation Ratings  
Rating Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
1 22 1.6 3.1 3.1 
2 10 0.7 1.4 4.5 
3 27 1.9 3.8 8.4 
4 39 2.8 5.5 13.9 
5 78 5.6 11.1 25.0 
6 71 5.1 10.1 35.1 
7 103 7.3 14.6 49.7 
8 127 9.0 18.0 67.8 
9 75 5.3 10.7 78.4 
10 152 10.8 21.6 100.0 
     Total (n) 704 50.1 100.0 
 System Missing 701 49.9 
  Total (N) 1405 100.0     
     
     Frequency Distribution for Youth Programs Ratings 
Rating Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
 140 
1 22 1.6 3.1 3.1 
2 16 1.1 2.3 5.4 
3 28 2.0 4.0 9.4 
4 46 3.3 6.5 15.9 
5 95 6.8 13.5 29.4 
6 57 4.1 8.1 37.5 
7 100 7.1 14.2 51.7 
8 84 6.0 11.9 63.6 
9 31 2.2 4.4 68.0 
10 225 16.0 32.0 100.0 
     Total (n) 704 50.1 100.0 
 System Missing 701 49.9 
  Total (N) 1405 100.0     
     
     Frequency Distribution for Countering Gang Activities Ratings 
Rating Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
1 33 2.3 4.7 4.7 
2 19 1.4 2.7 7.4 
3 43 3.1 6.1 13.5 
4 54 3.8 7.7 21.2 
5 109 7.8 15.5 36.6 
6 75 5.3 10.7 47.3 
7 78 5.6 11.1 58.4 
8 90 6.4 12.8 71.2 
9 31 2.2 4.4 75.6 
10 172 12.2 24.4 100.0 
     Total (n) 704 50.1 100.0 
 System Missing 701 49.9 
  Total (N) 1405 100.0     
     
     Frequency Distribution for Fire Protection Ratings 
Rating Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
1 6 0.4 0.9 0.9 
2 7 0.5 1.0 1.9 
3 6 0.4 0.9 2.7 
4 4 0.3 0.6 3.3 
5 32 2.3 4.6 7.8 
 141 
6 22 1.6 3.1 11.0 
7 52 3.7 7.4 18.4 
8 156 11.1 22.3 40.7 
9 123 8.8 17.5 58.2 
10 293 20.9 41.8 100.0 
     Total (n) 701 49.9 100.0 
 System Missing 704 50.1 
  Total (N) 1405 100.0     
     
     
     Frequency Distribution of Crime Prevention Effort Ratings 
Rating Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
1 39 2.8 5.6 5.6 
2 33 2.3 4.7 10.3 
3 31 2.2 4.4 14.7 
4 33 2.3 4.7 19.4 
5 99 7.0 14.1 33.5 
6 73 5.2 10.4 43.9 
7 114 8.1 16.3 60.2 
8 124 8.8 17.7 77.9 
9 54 3.8 7.7 85.6 
10 101 7.2 14.4 100.0 
     Total (n) 701 49.9 100.0 
 System Missing 704 50.1 
  Total (N) 1405 100.0     
     
     Frequency Distribution of Street Repair Ratings  
Rating Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
1 35 2.5 5.0 5.0 
2 23 1.6 3.3 8.3 
3 26 1.9 3.7 12.0 
4 41 2.9 5.8 17.8 
5 85 6.0 12.1 30.0 
6 66 4.7 9.4 39.4 
7 95 6.8 13.6 52.9 
8 163 11.6 23.3 76.2 
9 68 4.8 9.7 85.9 
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10 99 7.0 14.1 100.0 
     Total (n) 701 49.9 100.0 
 Missing 704 50.1 
  Total (N) 1405 100.0     
     
     Frequency Distribution for Housing for Poor Rating 
Rating Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
1 52 3.7 7.4 7.4 
2 41 2.9 5.8 13.3 
3 41 2.9 5.8 19.1 
4 56 4.0 8.0 27.1 
5 119 8.5 17.0 44.1 
6 47 3.3 6.7 50.8 
7 73 5.2 10.4 61.2 
8 61 4.3 8.7 69.9 
9 25 1.8 3.6 73.5 
10 186 13.2 26.5 100.0 
     Total (n) 701 49.9 100.0 
 System Missing 704 50.1 
  Total (N) 1405 100.0     
     
     Frequency Distribution for Attracting New Employers Rating  
Rating Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
1 22 1.6 3.1 3.1 
2 17 1.2 2.4 5.6 
3 18 1.3 2.6 8.1 
4 26 1.9 3.7 11.8 
5 110 7.8 15.7 27.5 
6 78 5.6 11.1 38.7 
7 114 8.1 16.3 54.9 
8 110 7.8 15.7 70.6 
9 37 2.6 5.3 75.9 
10 169 12.0 24.1 100.0 
     Total (n) 701 49.9 100.0 
 System Missing 704 50.1 
  Total (N) 1405 100.0     
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     Frequency Distribution for Ambulance Service Rating 
Rating Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
1 6 0.4 0.9 0.9 
2 5 0.4 0.7 1.6 
3 6 0.4 0.9 2.4 
4 10 0.7 1.4 3.9 
5 36 2.6 5.1 9.0 
6 25 1.8 3.6 12.6 
7 56 4.0 8.0 20.5 
8 154 11.0 22.0 42.5 
9 101 7.2 14.4 56.9 
10 302 21.5 43.1 100.0 
     Total (n) 701 49.9 100.0 
 System Missing 704 50.1 
  Total (N) 1405 100.0     
     
     
     
     Frequency Distribution of Art and Cultural Events Rating 
Rating Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
1 23 1.6 3.3 3.3 
2 12 0.9 1.7 5.0 
3 20 1.4 2.9 7.8 
4 27 1.9 3.9 11.7 
5 91 6.5 13.0 24.7 
6 66 4.7 9.4 34.1 
7 103 7.3 14.7 48.8 
8 150 10.7 21.4 70.2 
9 58 4.1 8.3 78.5 
10 151 10.7 21.5 100.0 
     Total (n) 701 49.9 100.0 
 System Missing 704 50.1 
  Total (N) 1405 100.0     
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Frequency Distribution for Providing Job Training Rating 
Rating Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
1 37 2.6 5.3 5.3 
2 23 1.6 3.3 8.6 
3 31 2.2 4.4 13.0 
4 43 3.1 6.1 19.1 
5 104 7.4 14.8 34.0 
6 52 3.7 7.4 41.4 
7 79 5.6 11.3 52.6 
8 61 4.3 8.7 61.3 
9 15 1.1 2.1 63.5 
10 256 18.2 36.5 100.0 
     Total (N) 701 49.9 100.0 
 System Missing 704 50.1 
  Total  1405 100.0     
     
     
     Frequency Distribution for Library Service Ratings  
Rating Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
1 25 1.8 2.4 2.4 
2 16 1.1 1.5 3.9 
3 23 1.6 2.2 6.1 
4 19 1.4 1.8 7.9 
5 63 4.5 6.0 13.9 
6 58 4.1 5.5 19.4 
7 110 7.8 10.4 29.8 
8 224 15.9 21.3 51.0 
9 141 10.0 13.4 64.4 
10 375 26.7 35.6 100.0 
     Total (n) 1054 75.0 100.0 
 System Missing 351 25.0 
  Total (N) 1405 100.0     
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